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Themain rationale for the application of economics to law is simply that justice is
not a free good. There are competing systems of administering justice, and the
implementation of any system uses scarce resources. We must decide, for example,
on which activities to restrict, ways to detect and prosecute violations, types of
penalties, and options available to those accused. Since the alternatives are numer-
ous and resources are scarce, choices must be made. These points are obvious to
an economist. Yet in law, particularly in the field of criminal justice, principles are
expounded and policies are advocated that give little attention to the scarcity of
resources. Moreover, the neglect of scarcity can be the source of much confusion
when one attempts to develop policies consistent with widely held legal principles.
Let me cite a few examples which also point up the usefulness of an economic
approach.
1. Innocent persons should never be convicted of crimes. If this were society's
only goal, the solution would be clear—convict no one. Although this has appeal
to anarchists, most of us accept the view that a person should be convicted if guilt
is established beyond a reasonable doubt. This generalization is not very helpful
since it begs the question of defining "reasonable doubt." The wider one sets the
range for reasonable doubt, the stronger the evidence necessary for conviction,
and the greater the resources devoted to the judicial process. We can make this
choice explicit with the following question: What quantity of resources should be
allocated to reducing the probability that innocent persons are convicted of
crimes? Unfortunately, not only does the response to this question tend to the
absolute, but the question itself arouses objection. Such a question is labelled
unprincipled or immoral because it attempts to put a price on the fundamental
right of an individual not to be convicted unjustly. Nevertheless, the question is
the correct one to ask. The advantage of making the choice of resources explicit is
to force one to evaluate the gains and costs of alternative procedures; for example,
jury versus nonjury trials or settlements versus trials.
2. "Equal justice for all" is widely accepted as a desirable goal. However, its
implementation may be exceedingly costly. The quality and quantity of lawyers,
advisors, etc., depend in part on one's wealth. Other things being constant, wealthy
individuals would fare better than poor ones in the judicial process.' To reduce
this disparity between rich and poor, we could subsidize legal counsel for the poor
(see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372U.s.335 [1963]). Alternatively, we could limit
the resource investment by the rich, although the difficulties in enforcing such a
limit are likely to be very great. Even with these subsidies or restrictions, there are
many factors which could lead to different outcomes or "justice" in otherwise
similar situations. Presumably, better-educated persons will have a comparative
advantage in understanding the complexities of the law. Persons who administer
the law differ in their talents, qualifications, outlook, ethics, and other characteris-
tics. It is well-known that, holding constant a number of background factors,
there is considerable variation in penalties for individuals convicted of similar
offenses [13]. Although these differences may be largely random, they still pro-
mote unequal justice. The degree of inequality can be partially remedied by better-
trained judges and by wider access to appeals courts. All such remedies involve
calculations about the gains and losses from scarce resources. The main decision
should concern the optimal amount of unequal justice, and any movement toward
more equal justice need not be desirable once the costs are taken into account.
NOTE: The author wishes to express his thanks to Hal Lary and Elisabeth Landes for
many helpful comments.
This proposition is not as self-evident as it may seem. Under certain conditions the relation-
ship between wealth and the probability of conviction depends upon the form of punishment.
The probability of conviction tends to fall with wealth when penalties are jail sentences and
rise with wealth when penalties are fines. Empirical analysis of convictions in the U.S. Courts
provides some support for this hypothesis.
23. The failure to view time as a scarce resource has led to policies designed to
promote "equal justice" that may have had the opposite effect. Consider the prac-
tice of charging a zero or nominal price for the courts. This is advocated as a means
of not denying the poor the use of the courts; however, its effect is often the oppo-
site. A zero price will generally lead to a queue awaiting trial as a means of ration-
ing supply. Thus, the costs of going to trial become the opportunity cost of
waiting. These costs will be greater, and hence the use of trials lower, for defend-
ants detained in jail prior to trial than for those released. Since the bail system
tends to detain low-income defendants, a zero court price will result in more pre-
trial settlements, and hence fewer trials, for the latter group. In my paper on the
courts [.8] I show that an appropriate money price can not only reduce trial delay
(which is argued to be an evil itself—"justice delayed is justice denied") but can
increase the use of trials by low-income defendants. Thus, a zero price, taken
together with the bail system, promotes both court delay and a distribution of trial
services at variance with equal justice.2
Another example is the mandatory prison sentence rather than giving con-
victed persons the option of paying a money fine. The latter is argued to be
inconsistent with the principle of equal justice because fines would permit the
rich to buy their way out while the poor would go to jail. Although the rich
would be more likely to pay fines and be less likely to go to prison, this need
not imply unequal justice once we realize that time has an implicit price. Jail
sentences for all would imply larger losses from a given sentence for persons
with greater values for their time. Substituting fines may move us closer to
"equal justice" in the sense of equal penalties, but this of course will depend
on the rate at which fines are exchanged into sentences.3 Moreover, if one's
conception of equal justice includes compensation to victims, a system of fines
can be more advantageous as it provides resources for compensation.
ARGUMENTSAGAINST APPLYING ECONOMICS TO LAW
Onecan accept the notion that economic principles are relevant to law and yet
argue that economic analysis is not appropriate for studying such problems. Econ-
omists have generally restricted their study to economic problems involving
choices in the market sector. Aside from tradition, we can give two reasons why
economists have avoided, or even objected to, an economic analysis of law. Neither
one is especially convincing.
The first is the belief that persons engaged in illegal activities are "out of touch"
or "irrational." These individuals are not motivated by the usual pecuniary costs
and gains considerations. Instead they behave compulsively, and explanations for
their behavior are to be found in certain distinct sociological, psychological, or
possibly physical characteristics. Criminals are viewed as a type of noncompeting
group, and hence the principles that explain the behavior of persons in legal activi-
ties would not be relevant in explaining entrance into illegal activities.4 This
rationale for rejecting an economic approach is not convincing because (1) re-
searchers have had little success in discovering distinct criminal characteristics
that make criminals unresponsive to cost and gain considerations, and (2) one has
difficulty in defining intrinsic differences between criminal and legitimate activi-
ties. Therefore, I see no a priori reason for ruling out an economic approach. This
approach should stand or fall on its ability to predict behavior, and for this we
2should point out that the real culprit here is the bail system that detains low-income
defendants. If the bail system as it stands were modified to permit the release of more low-
income defendants, "unequal justice" between rich and poor need not be increased by a zero trial
charge. However, a zero charge would still discriminate against those not making bail.
For a full discussion of the case for fines see Gary Becker [1,pp.193-198].
'Packer[9]implicitlyaccepts this view of criminals as a noncompeting group by regarding
expected penalties as a type of tariff that protects criminals from the competition of ordinary
businessmen.
3have to wait for a full development and testing of economic models of crime.
A second and more subtle objection relates to the nonmarket character of the
law. Economists usually confine their research to the market sector where prices
exist. However, in law not only are there no explicit prices for principles such as
justice, but when prices do exist they are often in terms of time and not money
(e.g., jail sentences and court queues). Since the main theorems of economics con-
cern the effects of changes in relative money prices, one could argue that the
absence of money prices would severely restrict the economic approach. However,
as long as there is choice, prices must exist. If not money prices, then we can
derive shadow prices that serve the same function as money prices in the theory
of choice.
To illustrate this point, consider the problem of allocating resources to reducing
the likelihood of an incorrect judicial decision (i.e., either convicting an innocent
person or releasing a guilty one). Let us assume the following: (1)theonly scarce
resource is time in the judicial process, which is fixed in the aggregate at T0; (2)an
increased allocation of time to thecase will reduce the probability of an incor-
rect decision,(3) incorrect decisions are weighted bythe sentence an indi-
vidual would receive if convicted, so that the community's losses are symmetrical
with respect to releasing a guilty person or convicting an innocent one when both
are faced with the same sentence; and (4) the judiciary's decision rule is to mini-
mize the sum of its losses across all n individuals being prosecuted. Minimizing
L = + [T0 — (I)
yields the first-order conditions:
1 (2)
where ￿ 0 and ô2P1/oT12> 0. Therefore, we allocate more resources to
cases involving bigger penalties and where the probability of making an error is
more likely to be reduced by inputs of time. The shadow price of time in thecase
is simply A/Si. An increase in the latter relative to the shadow price in the jthcase
due to a decline in willlead to a shift in resources from i to j.Thus,our
shadow prices have the same rationing effect as money prices.
CRIMERESEARCH AT THE NBER
Inthis section several research projects in law and economics are set forth. The
approach taken in these studies owes a large debt to the major article on crime
by Gary Becker [1].Workon these projects has already begun, and results to date
suggest that they will yield useful insights in explaining observed behavior and
in formulating optimal law enforcement policy.
Isaac Ehrlich makes use of the state-of-the-world approach to uncertainty to
develop a model of entry into illegal activities. These activities are assumed to have
uncertain outcomes due to possible punishment, in contrast to legal activities
whose outcomes are known with certainty. Individuals allocate their time between
illegal and legal activities to maximize their expected utility, where increases in
punishments and probabilities of conviction, other things constant, lower the
return and hence supply of illegal activities. Ehrlich's model enables him to derive
theorems on the determinants of specialization in "crime" as against participation
in both legal and illegal activities, and on the amount of self-protection (e.g., re-
ducing the probability of apprehension and conviction) that offenders undertake
to reduce their costs in illegal activities.
The main contribution of Ehrlich's study is undoubtedly an empirical analysis
of deterrence. The continuing debate over whether or not punishments and con-
4viction probabilities deter has been conducted with little evidence presented by
either side. Using data from the 1940, 1950, and 1960 Uniform Crime Reports,
and employing single-equation and simultaneous-equation techniques, Ehrlich is
able to measure both across states and over time the responses of specific felonies
to changes in variables reflecting deterrents and gains to crime. Despite numerous
deficiencies in the data, the results support the basic hypotheses of the economic
model. Specific crime rates vary inversely with estimates of penalties and probabil-
ities of conviction; deterrent effects tend to be greater for crimes against property
than against persons; crimes against property vary positively with both income
inequality and the level of family income. Further analysis is being done on the
time trend of specific crimes in the U.S. to uncover the factors underlying the
observed growth of crime since World War II. Finally, a comparative analysis of
crime variations in other countries is planned.
My studies of the court system and bail system are described in detail in Part II,
section 3, of this Report. A brief summary is presented here. In the study of the
court system, I first develop a model to identify the variables relevant to the choice
between a trial and a settlement, which include estimates of the probability of
conviction by trial, the severity of the crime, the availability and productivity of
the prosecutor's and defendant's resources, trial versus settlement costs, and at-
titudes toward risk. The model is then used to analyze the existing bail system
and court delay, and to predict the effects of a variety of proposals designed to
improve the bail system and reduce court delay. Finally, the model is applied, with
some modifications, to civil cases. Multiple regression techniques are used to test
a number of hypotheses derived from the model. Considerable evidence is found
to support the hypothesis that an increase in the cost differential between a trial
and settlement reduces the demand for the former and increases the demand for
the latter. An empirical analysis of conviction rates is also undertaken.
In the bail study I develop a model of an optimal bail system. My approach is
to derive a social benefit function that incorporates both the gains to defendants
from being released on bail and the costs and gains to the rest of the community
from their release. I then determine the level of resource expenditures on the bail
system and the number of defendants to release that are consistent with the
maximization of the social benefit. An important feature of the analysis is that
it permits a consideration of alternative methods to select defendants for release
or, in effect, alternative bail systems. Two systems are analyzed: one, which cor-
responds to most existing bail systems in the United States and other countries,
where defendants must pay for their release, and the other, where defendants are
compensated for their detention. Although the optimality conditions are largely
unaffected by whether the defendant had to pay or was paid, there are several
advantages to a system in which defendants are paid. The major advantage is
eliminating the punitive aspect of the bail system, since those detained are fully
compensated for their losses from detention. Other advantages include reducing
discrimination against low-income defendants and providing incentives for the
state to improve pretrial detention facilities.
THEEFFECTS OF LEGISLATION
Legislationoutlawing or restricting different kinds of economic and social be-
havior has grown rapidly in this century, but we have little knowledge of the
actual as distinguished from the intended effects of existing legislation. Empirical
studies on the effects of legislation have been much neglected. Frequently, the
existence of a law is looked on as evidence of its success. Sometimes attempts to
evaluate the efficacy of a law evolve into an enumeration of its enforcement
provisions. Explicit consideration of the basic question is usually missing: Does
the legislation have an effect on the behavior it seeks to regulate?
The methods of economics are well-suited to answering this question. Theory
.5enables us to make qualitative predictions on the variables likely to be affected
by the law, while econometric techniques enable us to disentangle the effects of
the law from other factors. The great legal scholar, Oliver Wendell Holmes, noted
this when he. wrote:
For the rational study of the law the black-letter man may be the man of the
present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of
economics. [6, p. 83].
There are basically two complementary approaches in evaluating legislation. Both
start from the presumption that legislation affects behavior primarily through the
penalties handed out for violations and the probabilities of convicting violators.
Other things held constant, the greater the severity of punishments and the higher
the conviction probabilities, the more effective the legislation. One caveat should
be noted: "effective" is not meant to denote more desirable legislation but rather
that the law will have a greater impact on behavior.
The first approach attempts to measure punishments and probabilities of con-
viction and relate them to gains from violation of the law. Unfortunately, it is
usually impossible to fully satisfy the requirements of the direct approach because
data on the number of violations are not available. Hence, estimates of the
probability of conviction cannot be made. (For example, we do not know how
many violations of antitrust laws or fair employment laws are committed each
year.) Nevertheless, this approach is still promising since certain components
are available. Statistics can usually be compiled on punishments given to convicted
offenders. There may be records of persons or firms accused, and the length of
time taken to decide cases. Posner [10] has compiled a history of punishments
meted out to convicted violators of antitrust laws. He found that those convicted
and punished were a small fraction of those apprehended (the latter are a
fraction of those who actually commit violations), and the punishments were not
large—at least until the expansion of triple-damage suits. These results suggest
that the expected costs of violating antitrust laws are small and, therefore, that
these laws have not significantly deterred collusion.
The second approach is to estimate the effect of the law on observed behavior
without explicitly using measures of penalties or conviction probabilities. We
first identify the variables expected to change in response to the law. Let us con-
sider a few examples. In my study of fair employment laws [7] I showed that
these laws should lead to an increase in the ratio of nonwhite to white wages
and to a widening in unemployment differentials between nonwhites and whites.
Fuchs and Levinson [4] used death rates from automobile accidents to calculate
the effects of compulsory automobile inspection in states. Geisel et a!. [5] used
homicide rates, suicide rates, and accidental deaths from firearms to measure the
effects of state and local gun control legislation. Stigler estimated the effect of
the Securities Exchange Commission by analyzing the performance of new is-
sues [12], and the effect of electric utility regulation by examining the level and
structure of rates [11].
To test the law's effect we take a set of observations that are distinguished by
the fact that for some observations, say states, the law exists, while for others it
does not. If all states were subject to the law, distinctions would be made by other
characteristics, such as the number of years since passage of the law, the extent
of its provisions and coverage, penalties, and expenditures used for enforcement
(which serve as proxies for differences in the probabilities of conviction). Multiple
regressions of the following general form could then be estimated:
Y=AX+BL+u, (3)
where Y is a vector of dependent variables, X is a vector of exogeneous variables
predicted to affect Y, and L is a vector of law variables. The regression coefficient
on L will then measure the law's effect. In the simplest case, L would consist of a
6dummy variable indicating the presence or absence of the law. If data permit, L
would be expanded to include other measures suggested above. Using these tech-
niques, I found that fair employment laws raised nonwhite—white male wages
and widened unemployment differentials. These variables were not affected by
differences among states in enforcement expenditures or in years that fair em-
ployment laws had been in existence. Fuchs and Levinson found that compul-
sory inspection of automobiles reduced death rates from auto accidents across
states, and that states having more than one annual inspection tended to have a
greater impact than states with only one. Geisel et al. found that gun control
legislation tended to be more effective across states and cities in reducing suicide
and accidental deaths from firearms than in reducing homicide rates.
The major difficulty with the multivariate approach is that conclusions of
effectiveness (e.g., Fuchs, Geisel) tend to be based on results from a cross-section
analysis of one time period.. However, the possibility exists that differences ob-
served in one cross section existed prior to the legislation. In fact, a plausible
interpretation of a significant coefficient on the law variable is that differences
in the dependent variable led to the passage of the legislation rather than the
reverse. For example, higher nonwhite to white earnings in fair employment states
were indicative of a relatively strong position for nonwhites, which in turn led
to the passage of fair employment legislation. States with lower automobile death
rates were more safety-minded to begin with, and this led to the passage of com-
pulsory inspection. In states with fewer guns, and hence fewer deaths from guns,
there was less opposition to the passage of gun control legislation. One way to
overcome this difficulty is to compute a regression similar to (3)fora time period
before the passage of legislation in any of the states, using the law variable from
the original cross section. Then a nonsignificant coefficient on the law variable
in the earlier time period would indicate that, prior to legislation, there were no
significant differences between states that enacted laws and states that did not.
Clearly, such a finding would buttress the results from a single cross section.
This is precisely what I did in my paper on fair employment laws. The problem
is largely avoided when time-series rather than cross-section data are employed.
Stigler has relied on time-series data in his research cited above. Concentration
on cross-section data has been due to the lack of data for earlier years. However,
a thorough study requires some time-series analysis even from fragmentary data.
The acid test of effectiveness is to show that the law changed observed behavior
and this will only show up in an analysis over time.
Research on the effects of legislation has been done on a limited scale by
economists. It remains a fruitful area for further research and one that should
contribute to public policy issues. At the National Bureau we have in mind several
types of legislation for analysis. They include antitrust, accident liability, mini-
mum schooling, and divorce legislation.
CONCLUDINGREMARKS
Wehave advocated empirical analysis of the consequences of legislation without
a theory of legislation. It would be preferable to treat legislation as an endogenous
variable and simultaneously estimate the effects of legislation and the forces lead-
ing to passage. This is especially desirable in view of the difficulty cited above in
discerning whether the effect we attribute to the legislation was not instead a
factor that gave rise to the legislation. However, there is at present no widely
accepted positive theory of legislation. What economists have put forth is a body
of theory on divergencies between private and social cost which has been used to
justify various types of government intervention and legislation. We lack a theory
that would offer predictions as to the types of behavior to be restricted by legis-
lation, the extent of restrictions, the amount of resources allocated to enforcement
and the penalties for violation. Thus the difficulty of treating legislation as an
7endogenous variable is apparent We do not know the structural equation that has
the law as its dependent variable.5
In summary, I have tried to establish the contribution that economic analysis
can make to two specific areas of law: crime and the effects of legislation. In both
areas, administrators and legislators are continually making decisions with little
empirical evidence to guide their choices. We hope that economic research can
begin to provide the evidence needed for careful policy formulation and evalu-
ation.
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Without a theory, interesting work can nevertheless be done on estimating forces related to
the passage of laws. For example, Block [2) in a thesis being completed at Columbia on the
effects of rent control has found that cities decontrolling earlier (after World War II) were
those with lower population densities and fewer tenants relative to home owners. The former
suggests a more elastic supply response for new housing and the latter may be related to the
political appeal of rent control. In my own work on fair employment laws I touched briefly
on the forces leading to passage. One important negative finding was that the passage of these
laws In states was not related to either the level or rate of change in the proportion of nonwhites.
8THE NBER APPROACH TO
HUMAN RESOURCE PROBLEMS—Finis R. Welch
Indiscussing future directions for Bureau research vis-à-vis problems of human
resources, I have neither a crystal ball nor an explicit "theory" of markets for
research. So in the best traditions, I will measure and extrapolate without the
internal consistency constraints of either a crystal ball or a theory. The objective
is limited: a discussion of recent Bureau-sponsored research in the area of human
resources and suggestions of areas that I see as most promising for future research.
The Bureau has been at the center of developments in the "human capital
approach" largely through its association with Gary Becker and Jacob Mincer, and
much of the discussion is directed to this approach. Certainly, there is much
more to human resources than capital, but the human capital approach is and
has been an important tool for analyses of labor productivity. Schultz [32] draws
a highly relevant distinction between human resources and human capital.
Thus my interpretation of the term "human resources" is that it encompasses
all of the many attributes of a people—physical, biological, psychological, and
cultural—that account both for the social values that determine preferences
and the economic value of the producer and consumer services that a people
render whether they come to them as earnings or as personal satisfactions
directly. (p. 11)
Human capital is strictly an economic concept. Although it pertains to par-
ticular attributes of man, it is not intended to serve those who are engaged in
analyzing psychological, social or cultural behavior. It is a form of capital
because it is the source of future earnings, or future satisfactions or both of
them. It is human because it is an integral part of man. (p. 6)
While there are other forms of human capital, health and educational capital
have received the most attention, the original emphasis falling largely upon edu-
cation. No one was surprised when those first interested in human capital asserted
that education is an investment that conditions labor earnings. But when
Schultz [30] and Dennison [10] suggested that between 20 and 40 per cent of U.S.
economic growth this century may be attributable to increased per capita school-
ing; when Mincer [25, 26, 28] suggested that a larger fraction of personal income
inequality is explained by differences in individual schooling and investments in
on-the-job training than by differences in the ownership of physical capital; and
when Becker [2] and Hansen [18] calculated the very considerable internal rates
of return to schooling, the economic world took note. The arrival of human capital
as a fully legitimate area of research was signalled by the Exploratory Conference
on Capital Investment in Human Beings, in December 1961, which was sponsored
by the Universities-National Bureau Committee for Economic Research [31]. At
the conference, Becker presented his paper "Investment in Human Capital: A
Theoretical Analysis," which remains as the cornerstone of the theoretical founda-
tion for the human capital approach. Mincer presented "On-the-Job-Training:
Cost, Returns, and Some Implications," which led us to think of postschool
age—income profiles as something other than a purely physical maturation and
aging process. Stigler presented "Information in the Labor Market," which taught
us that it can be smart to be ignorant. Also at this conference, Sjaastad and Mush-
kin noted that migration and health are legitimate aspects of human capital and
Weisbrod suggested that while sunk costs are sunk, there is real value in not
sinking your costs too soon (i.e., the concept of the "option" value of staying
in school).
NOTE: I owe much to my reading of T. W. Schultz', "Human Capital: Policy Issues
and Research Opportunities," a paper prepared for a. series of NBER colloquia in honor
of the fiftieth anniversary year. His assignment was to discuss many of the same kinds
of things discussed here, and I have drawn freely from his comments.
9It is noteworthy that the human capital approach headed Harry Johnson's [22]
listof four new approaches having high potential in analyzing social problems,
which also included "time as a fundamental unit of cost," a direct descendant of
the human capital approach. The list also includes Stigler's recognition that in-
formation may not be a free good, which as I have noted is itself a sibling of the
human capital approach.
Since the original Bureau conference, the human capital literature has flourished
but it is now clear that the main theme had been set. Much of the Bureau research
now in progress is a direct descendant. In the following sections, I consider a few
areas that have absorbed, and presumably will continue to absorb, much of the
Bureau's "human resources" research effort. The concluding section contains a
discussion of omitted areas that I consider worthwhile.
EDUCATIONAND EARNINGS
Itis likely that income—education relationships have absorbed a larger fraction
of research resources devoted to human capital than all other aspects of the
problem. Originally, we were fascinated with calculating and refining estimates
of internal rates of return. That investments in man could be "more productive"
than investments in machines was an intriguing idea. But these days few resources
are devoted to estimating rates of return. The ballpark estimates for the U.S. came
quickly and easily and improvements await better data. We did, I think, learn
something from these estimates. First, ignoring all aspects of schooling other than
sheer income-generating capacity, U.S. investments in schooling have been profit-
able. The highest returns may have accompanied a push toward universal elemen-
tary education, but the returns to high school and college appear to have been
competitive.1 We have also learned that "schooling" is a reasonably well-behaved
factor in the sense that its monetary returns are affected by factor ratios, and that
because of this the profitability of educational investments is subject to change
as skill distributions and factor endowments change.2
But research interest these days appears to have shifted to more fundamental
questions that hopefully will not only improve our estimates of rates of return but
will be valuable for other purposes. At the micro level, the question of economic
determinants of the "shape" of the age—income profile continues to absorb a good
deal of attention as does the closely related question of the nature of the ability—
schooling—age interrelations. At the macro level, we are focusing more on the
determinants of income distributions and the determinants of the "payoff" to
schooling.
Building upon the Mincer [27] analysis as refined by Ben-Porath [6and7],
Sherwin Rosen [29] is working on optimal life-cycle income profiles with the
objective of estimating the depreciation of human capital over the life cycle.3
In these models, on-the-job training is the vehicle for transforming current income
foregone into future earnings. The schooling period is viewed as a corner solution
in which people "specialize" in learning, and this period is characteristically
followed by one in which individuals simultaneously learn and earn. Over the
course of this second period the learning—earning mix shifts steadily in favor of
earning, as a result of the shortening future working span over which investments
in learning are récouped. To avoid the corner solution of specializing in either
earning or learning it is necessary (at a point in time) that there be increasing
marginal difficulty in transforming present earnings foregone into discounted
1Schultz[32] offers an extensive summary of the estimates available for the U.S.
2Griliches [16] provides real insight into this problem in his discussion of education in pro-
duction functions. Relations between relative wages and rates of return are explored by
Welch [36],whoprovides cross-sectional evidence for the U.S. Bowles [8]addsan interna-
tional cross section.
For a different approach to estimating these depreciation rates, see T. Johnson [23].
10future earnings. In the Ben-Porath model this is accomplished by intraperiod
increasing marginal investment cost, pure and simple. But, in the Rosen model,
learning is assumed to be a joint product of an occupation such that the learning
rate is specified by the occupation and cannot be varied. Jobs vary in learning
(i.e., future earning) intensity, and workers bid for jobs by agreeing to accept
lower wages for more learning-intensive occupations. The "price" of learning is
imputed from wage differentials and the necessary condition for an interior solu-
tion is that the implicit price of the learning associated with jobs must rise more
than proportionately with learning intensity. That is, the unit cost of learning
must be an increasing function of the rate at which learning occurs, as is true of
the Ben-Porath model. The difference is the linkage to occupation, for, if the world
is as Rosen hypothesizes, then his model implies an optimal pattern of occupa-
tional mobility over a person's career.
The Rosen model can be criticized on the grounds that the occupations he
envisions probably correspond only slightly to occupations as they are defined
in the available data. But this problem is not insurmountable. Instead of defining
an occupation by a learning rate that is constant, let the rate of learning be, say, a
declining function of experience in the occupation. This is not the important fea-
ture of the Rosen model. It is rather that the effects of differences in initial con-
ditions, e.g., the availability of funds for investing in on-the-job training or the
quality of schools attended, can be traced throughout a person's career. In this
society, initial conditions are perhaps more affected by a person's progenitors
than by himself (that is why they are called initial), so that the optimal life-cycle
models of Ben-Porath and Rosen can be tailored to develop models of intergenera-
tional mobility.
This leads to my first suggestions for future research. In my opinion economists
have too long ignored the intergenerational aspects of poverty and the sociologists
who have addressed the problem have worked only with descriptive intergenera-
tional mobility matrices, leaving no room for individual choice. If reducing poverty
is a legitimate social objective, then it seems that it is even more legitimate to re-
duce inherited poverty. It is sad that we continue to be as ignorant as we are of
the factors affecting motivation and alienation. Theoretical tools for addressing
these problems are, or will soon be, available and the data base is not empty.
The Bureau is now sponsoring a number of projects that attempt to refine the
nature of income—schooling relationships by examining interrelations with meas-
ured ability. Taubman and Wales [35] have just completed a manuscript that
explores several aspects of the problem. Among their more interesting observa-
tions they conclude that although the proportion of the student population enter-
ing college has continued to rise, their average ability levels have not fallen.
Instead, colleges have admitted higher fractions of more able students from lower
income families and they have become more adept at "screening" (i.e., identifying,
or at least admitting) more able students. Correspondingly, the average ability
of students completing high school but not going on to college has fallen. This
raises an interesting possibility. The presence of "scalloped" age-adjusted income—
schooling profiles has interested many persons who worked with the 1960 Census
data. Briefly, the observation is that persons who attended, but did not complete;
either high school or college earned less than would have been predicted by inter-
polation of income levels between elementary and high school completion and
between high school and college completion. This effect has been alternatively
dubbed the "flunk-out" or "completion norm" effect. Presumably there was posi-
tive informational content to the observation that a person had completed what
he had begun. But, if the average ability of the high school graduate who does not
attend college continues to fall, the "diploma" effect may become negative.
Other conclusions developed by Taubman and Wales from the data they exam-
ined are that, while omitting ability from estimates of the return to schooling
does result in a systematic overestimate of the return to schooling (via positive
11ability-schooling correlations), the magnitude of the effect is small and that
omitting ability has probably resulted in only trivial overestimates of rates of re-
turn to schooling. This, of course, agrees with the conjecture of Zvi Griliches [16].
Another tentative conclusion is that, in adjusting for education and ability, if
the optimal occupational distribution as defined by income is compared with the
existing distribution, then the U.S. is much more efficient in distributing its
college graduates than its less-schooled citizens. Taubman and Wales attribute
this result to occupational screening, but there is another possibility that could
be investigated. Except for college graduates, the income associated with a given
amount of schooling varies greatly with location. Persons with less schooling earn
less in the South than in other regions. This suggests that there may be high
returns to migration for the less schooled and the "screening" may be more
geographic than discriminatory in its origin.
If the human capital approach has taught us anything, it is that income com-
parisons should be made in terms of something like net discounted values of life-
time earnings instead of comparing incomes at a particular point on the profile.
Along these lines, John Hause is exploring two sets of data in which interrelations
between income, schooling, and ability can be examined.4 The analysis is still pre-
liminary so the results can only imperfectly be foreseen, but it appears that in at
least one body of data, ability effects may be more economically significant than
the Griliches or Taubman-Wales findings indicate. Hause has a collection of
Swedish data giving I.Q. scores at two points in a person's life and annual earnings
data for very considerable periods of the working lifespan. Although the analysis
is in its infancy, these data should be instrumental in providing information both
about the ability question and life-cycle productivity. In addition, the NBER-
Thorndike sample is now ready for analysis and is potentially very rich. For a
fairly select population it provides earnings at a few points in a person's career
together with schooling data and scores on a variety of tests administered in 1943
as the sample population entered the U.S. Army Air Force. Thus, Bureau research
into the nature of the income—schooling relationship and the effects of ability
in the near future is easily predicted. Analysis of the available data will continue.
Two projected analyses of the NBER-Thorndike sample are especially interest-
ing. In one, Lewis Solmon and Paul Wachtel will merge information about univer-
sity attendance together with some characteristics of state school systems for
elementary and secondary schools in an attempt to identify some aspects of
schooling quality vis-â-vis future earning capacity. This effort closely parallels
the work by Johnson and Stafford [21] in respect to the precollege analysis, and a
comparison of the results will be illuminating.5 With regard to the analysis of
quality of college, it is hard to think of a more perfectly designed sample, and the
results should be of fundamental importance.
That college builds upon a very considerable educational history of the student
implies that it should at any empirical level be extremely difficult to "partial out"
its effects. But, the battery of scores for tests administered between high school
graduation and college enrollment offers an excellent opportunity to isolate the
college effects. Further, since the actual university attended is specified, schooling
data should be more accurately matched than is ordinarily possible.
Tom Juster, in a continuing analysis of the contributions of measured ability to
earnings, plans to focus upon interactions between occupation and implicit ability
prices. This is very important. First, it can address the question of the nature of
the measures we dub ability. If, for example, we measure something and call it
cognitive ability and then in regression analysis find that its implicit value is the
same in highly routinized manual occupations as in occupations that permit more
'Some of the early results are reported in [20].
main difference is that Johnson-Stafford have data for a point in time for people of
varying age, while the NBER-Thorndike sample refers to people of about the same age but
earnings are f or several points in the career.
12discretion in day-to-day functions, I for one would be very suspicious about
cognitive ability. Further, if measures of physical dexterity have value that is
independent of occupation, then I doubt that we are measuring what we think we
are. (There is room for optimism here, for Juster assures me privately that implicit
returns to digital dexterity is greater for doctors than lawyers.)
If these implicit tests of the tests pay off such thatinstruments warrant a
degree of confidence, then an interesting extension, similar to that of Taubman-
Wales, is possible. Given an individual's ability vector, there exists a lifetime
occupational mix that maximizes his income. How closely do the optimal occu-
pational distributions agree with observed distributions and to what is the dis-
agreement attributable?
With respect to the empirical effects of ability, I must admit a degree of skepti-
cism. I am afraid that we simply understand too little about the nature of skills
that are economically productive. The available measures of ability are often
designed not to answer questions about economic productivity, but about an
ability to succeed in school, which is not necessarily the same thing. I trust that
future research will tackle the thorny questions of what ability and schooling
mean. Presumably, it is skills that determine productivity, both economic and
otherwise. Some of these skills are produced in school and others are home pro-
duced or innate. By using simple summary measures like I.Q. we may conclude
that analyses of returns to schooling that omit ability give results that are simi-
lar to those that adjust for ability. From this it might be argued that little is
gained by trying to assess the effects of ability. But this conclusion may say more
about the value of current measures than about the nature of ability per Se. Obvi-
ously, it is important to determine whether, given current measures, the returns to
schooling are sensitive to ability adjustments. Current approaches will be informa-
tive on this count. But the larger question remains: What attributes of man affect
his behavior and economic productivity and where and how are these attributes
produced? Schooling remains a "black box" that appears to increase earning
capacity. Why this is true (i.e., exactly what is produced and how this is condi-
tioned by student characteristics determined outside the schools) remains un-
known. And, of more concern to me, we seem not to even be asking the relevant
questions.6
Herbert Gintis [14]hasobserved that in the available empirical studies that
correct for ability a common result emerges: There is little or no downward
adjustment in the return to schooling when ability is held constant. In some cases
measured ability is in fact a measure of cognitive achievement after the student
is no longer attending school. But, if the school produces cognitive abilities and
it is these abilities that lend value to schooling, then why is the residual (achieve-
ment constant) value of schooling so large? Gintis argues that (1) schools are not
primarily interested in producing cognitive achievement and (2) the productive
value of school attendance is owing largely to the "socializing" influence. Unfortu-
nately, socialization is not measured so that the hypothesis cannot be tested
directly.
Much of the Bureau's research effort concerning the income distributional effects
of human capital is summarized in a forthcoming book by Becker, Chiswick, and
Mincer [5]. Their accomplishments are several and I will indicate only a few.
First, Becker's Woytinsky lecture [4]isincluded, in which he cogently distin-
guishes between the effects of opportunity and ability and, in passing, provides
perhaps the best available operational definitions of these two complex concepts.
Opportunity is nothing more than the supply cost of funds for investing in human
capital. Ability is the ceteris paribus rate of .return to schooling. Thus, ability is
comparative advantage in school attendance defined by marginal efficiencies of
°Thereare, of course, exceptions. How other characteristics affect school performance is
addressed by those pursuing "educational production functions." See especially the work of
Hanushek [19]onthis score.
13investment. Mincer's original contributions of the human capital approach for
analyzing income distributions has been mentioned as being instrumental to our
thinking, and the contributions of the latest essay are considerable. Aside from
aptly demonstrating the sheer magnitude of the distribution of human capital in
explaining the income distribution, it brings an empirical pragmatism that is
valuable in helping us sort through the ever increasing stock of unexplored data.
In particular, the concept of the "overtaking age" provides a convenient way of
quickly deducing rates of return and of comparing life-cycle earnings. Chiswick
extends the analysis, showing the value of this approach in explaining differences
interregionally and internationally in both the dispersion and skewness of income
distributions.
This approach to income distribution is concentrated upon what fraction of
measured, income inequality is associated with differences in human capital.
Indeed, Mincer argues that perhaps two-thirds to three-fourths of the inequality
is explained by the human capital approach. Note that in most cases the return to
schooling is overestimated because of a positive covariance with ability and quality
of schooling.7 Since on-the-job training and schooling are positively related, the
ability and background effects are magnified in the full life-cycle comparison. This,
then, shows the necessity of relating the Mincer model to models like that of
Becker [4], which attempt to explain why differences in schooling exist in the
first place. If capital markets were perfect, if everyone maximized the present value
of lifetime earnings, and if everyone had the same ability and opportunity, then the
present worth of lifetime earnings would be independent of investments in school-
ing and on-the-job training. In this limiting case, the human capital approach
would be instrumental to explaining the inequality in the distribution of income
at a point in time, but only luck would explain differences over a lifetime. The
Becker-Chiswick-Mincer approach to understanding income distributions spot-
lights the need to "break into the box" and try to allocate the results of the human
capital between opportunity, ability, and luck.
Other Bureau research into the nature of education—income relationships in-
cludes my own work, which currently is a rather rudimentary analysis of what
makes schooled people more productive. I hope that there is a place in the Bureau's
research future for this type of analysis. We now have some evidence that the
value of schooling is conditioned not only by the content of the schools attended
and the characteristics of the student's background, but is affected by the environ-
ment in which schooling is employed. The value of schooling is related to the
skill distribution, to the availability of other productive factors, to the compara-
tive advantage of "on-site" training as opposed to the relative isolation of the
formal school, and is related to the pace at which first-order empirical rules of
thumb lose value relative to more basic rules, which in turn is related to the
complexity and pace of change in the economic environment. An understanding
of these factors is especially important for projecting the effects of schooling at
a macro level and it therefore is important in the organization of an economy for
growth.
HEALTHECONOMICS
Themajor Bureau thrust in the economics of health began three or four years ago,
signaled by Victor Fuchs' paper "Some Economic Aspects of Mortality." Follow-
ing the Fuchs distinction between health and medical care, Auster, Leveson, and
Sarachek [1] estimated a model in which medical care enters a health production
function. This distinction is also a prime feature in the work of Grossman [17],
whose theoretical model has health entering the utility function in two ways.
7A failure to correct for family background suggests that persons who are more schooled
may also have attended better schools.
14First, there is a direct effect of healthier days being happier days. Second, there is
an indirect effect of health on earning capacity. Medical care is seen as one input
into the production of health so that the demand for medical care is derived from
the demand for health. His empirical results suggest that this frame of reference
can be useful. Several related projects build upon this distinction of health and
medical care. Fuchs and Grossman [11] have a paper on correlations between
health and schooling, stressing simultaneous determination and implications for
efficiency using the household production function concept. Also, in a project
just initiated by Grossman, relations between health and education will be ex-
plored using the NBER-Thorndike sample.
Other recent projects include the work of Ro, showing that hospitals are sensi-
tive to economic factors in utilizing their facilities. Silver [33] is involved in ana-
lyzing differential mortality rates between race and sex, and Kramer and Fuchs
[12] are analyzing determinants of expenditures on physicians.
In health care, as throughout the service sector, output is especially hard to
measure independently of price. This severely limits analyses of efficiency in
resource allocation and analyses of the complex of factors determining produc-
tivity. In an approach that may have very general adaptability, Fuchs and Hughes
are examining the distribution of surgical manpower among various tasks, where
tasks are measured in common denominators of, say, hernia or appendectomy
units. It is uncertain whether this kind of approach will pan out, for there are
problems analytically similar to that of measuring the quantity of a product as
being proportional to the quantity of one particular input. This assumption is not
so bad when production is subject to fixed proportions or when relative input
prices are constant. Their approach is a start and we must await results.
EDUCATIONAND NONMARKET ACTIVITIES
AsBecker presented his theoretical base for aspects of the human capital approach
he relied heavily upon the opportunity cost of a student's time. Indeed, Schultz
in originally accounting for growth suggested that the major share of investment
in schooling was not in direct outlays but in the opportunity cost of not being at
work. In Mincer's measures of investments in on-the-job training, all investments
are foregone wages. Time is an input of major importance in building human
capital. But, if it is important to recognize the value of time as an input into
learning, is it not equally important in all aspects of consumer decisions? In his
seminal paper, "A Theory of the Allocation of Time," Becker [3] developed these
ideas. As work takes time, so does consumption. Things have both a direct cost
and a time cost. One immediate result of this frame of reference is the concept
of the household production function in which market goods, consumer time, and
other family characteristics combine to produce more fundamental arguments
for utility functions. A possible corollary is that since education appears to make
workers more efficient users of time because they produce more per unit of
time, might it not also make consumers more efficient users of time?
This led Bob Michael to a rather remarkable approach to viewing the deter-
mination of the composition of a family's consumption bundle. In his forthcoming
book [24], he demonstrates that when the head of a family has more education, the
composition is as though the family has more income than it does in fact. Its con-
sumption bundle is skewed in favor of more income-elastic goods. Thus we have
learned something. Not only does family education affect the composition of
consumption but it systematically shifts consumption in favor of luxury goods.
This is consistent with Becker's contention of greater household efficiency, i.e.,
more income per dollar.
In a somewhat related piece of research Lewis Solmon [34] concentrated upon
identifying relations between life-cycle saving behavior and education. He does
find a systemic relation: with more education save a disproportionate
15share of income, the discrepancy being largest for younger persons and declining
over the working lifespan. The data are not adequate to determine whether this
effect stems more from the fact that persons with more education have higher
incomes so that the contributions of social security and medicare are propor-
tionately less important in retirement, or whether increased education in fact
signals larger bequests.
Another aspect of the Becker theory of the allocation of time is that when wages
are high, the cost of market- as opposed to home-produced goods is low, and
when wages are rising, the consumption cost for time-intensive goods is also
rising. Pursuing this logic, Gilbert Ghez [13]analyzedthe life-cycle determinants
of consumption in a model that, holding wealth constant, gives a lifespan profile
to consumption. His empirical evidence reinforces the idea that consumers are
aware of the value of their time.
Other current Bureau research that draws heavily upon the concept of the
household production function and an interplay between education and the value
of time includes the analyses of fertility and the use of contraceptives by Michael,
Ross, Sanderson, and Willis, which is reported in a separate paper, and the work
of Michael Grossman, who is focusing upon the economics of health.
FUTUREDIRECTIONS
Incase all of my prejudices are not revealed in the earlier discussion, I will add
some comments on research possibilities. These suggestions are not intended to
be Bureau-specific, for a particular organization should be more specialized in its
effort. For example, Bureau-sponsored research has focused more narrowly on
the human capital approach than is necessarily optimal from a broader social
view of the wide range of problems related to all aspects of human resources.
That is, the proximity to people like Gary Becker and Jacob Mincer has given the
Bureau a comparative advantage in using the "language" of human capital.
To my own thinking, education-oriented research has too long ignored the im-
pact of the schooling process upon the formation of values. Given tastes, we have
been too "classical" in our attempts to maximize. Clearly, a schooling process
that spans the major formative period of a student's life will affect his values. The
work of Gintis is beginning to give us some insight on these points. His approach,
which addresses the question of the reward (grading?) system within schools,
can reveal something about the kind of student responses schools encourage.
Certainly, the growing emphasis on neighborhood schools and tuition vouchers,
as examples, indicates that the public is not completely satisfied by the way ob-
jectives are mirrored in larger decision units.
With respect to schooling, there is an obvious area for further research: school-
ing production functions. It is a social crime that we remain as ignorant as we
are of the technology of learning. The type of approach to which Coleman [9]
attracted so much attention appears to have real potential. By ordinary regressions
of measures of school output (test scores) on school and family characteristics,
systematic relations appear discernible. In fact, the results of Hanushek [19],
usingobservations of individual students through time, are very promising.
But, if this nut is to be cracked, we must have extensive data, observing students
over their schooling cycle. Questions of which teacher characteristics affect learn-
ing propensities and, in turn, how these characteristics are produced are ob-
viously important. Differences in the duration of impact for experiences at various
points in the learning career should be known in order to time learning experiences
efficiently. Perhaps students should be exposed to the "best" teachers as early
in their learning career as possible, because early experiences are longer lived
and a better prepared student is a better learner. Alternatively, students may not
be capable of capitalizing upon excellent teachers until they are more mature,
so that it would be efficient to delay exposure to the "better" teacher. And, as a
16third possibility, the skills required for teaching young persons are distinct from
those required for instruction of the more mature, so that it is really meaningless
to speak of optimal timing of "good" teachers. We can speculate so freely because
we know so little. Yet it is important that we learn. Coleman's conclusion that
characteristics of the home environment are very important in determining the
rate at which a student learns, a conclusion that to my knowledge is reinforced
by all subsequent related research, raises serious questions regarding equity. At
the least, we should attempt to determine which attributes of the home are im-
portant and how these attributes condition the productivity of schools.
It is precisely in areas like education, which are largely publicly funded and
in which the reflection of consumer desires are therefore more distorted, that
economic analysis can have its greatest value. And it is problems of this type that
demand attention. The cost of learning about educational technology will be high
because the necessary microdata will be expensive, but the returns might also be
high. It is possible that because this sort of analysis requires an extensive data
base, collected over considerable periods during individuals' learning careers, re-
search organizations like the Bureau have an advantage because they can guar-
antee more continuity of interest than can the individual working at a university.
Thus, I have a related suggestion, that the major research organizations become
data banks for the kind of time-series microdata that will obviously be so im-
portant for many aspects of social research.
In an earlier section, I suggested that more research be directed toward learning
about which teaching skills have value and whether these skills can be produced.
Most analyses of the economic value of education show that schooling increases
earnings where schooling is measured oniy by approximate years of attendance.
For many problems, this begs the question because the sword, school years, is
too dull. For example, in any of the problems associated with educational tech-
nology or "quality" of schooling, the question arises: Could the productive at-
tributes acquired in, say, the ninth year of school have been acquired prior to that
time? Unless we can find a reasonably comprehensive way of identifying the
essential characteristics of the ninth year, this sort of comparison is not possible.
If areas of concentration were measured by the cost of resources devoted to
researching them, I would guess that the question of life-cycle profiles of income,
skill assimilation, and occupational mobility will be among the two or three most
important in the next decade. Mincer has provided the benchmark, but many
questions have awaited the kind of data now emerging. With respect to human
capital, there is an obviously important question of how ability interacts with
lifetime earnings. Is "success" cumulative in the sense that those who have high
incomes early in their working career build on this advantage and broaden the
gap? Does Mincer's investment view dominate, so that those who accept ini-
tially low incomes eventually overtake those who opt for high incomes early
in the career? Are current measures of ability good enough to permit distinctions
between returns to ability and investments in on-the-job training? To answer
these questions, we must turn to life-cycle income histories. The cross-sectional
data are not adequate. With these same life-cycle data the question of intergenera-
tional linkages can be addressed. How economically mobile is our society and is
mobility increasing or decreasing through time?
This leads to a host of questions related to the economics of poverty. In work
now in progress at the Bureau, David Gordon [15]analyzesfactors affecting
earnings for ghetto residents. His conjecture is that a secondary labor force has
emerged in which members of this work force expect little upward mobility and
may be becoming disillusioned, so that their allegiance to the traditional working
career is weakening. He points out that traditionally those at the lower rungs of
the economic ladder have been immigrants from abroad or blacks who migrated
from the rural south to the urban ghetto and who expected, often for good
reason, their inferior economic status to be transitory. Now, many of those with
17the lowest incomes were born to this status and have little reason to expect upward
mobility. To date, empirical evidence vis-â-vis responses to traditional incentives
is sparse, but it is clear that this type of information will be fundamental in formu-
lating social policy.
The 1960 Census carried the information that the returns to schooling for
blacks were much less than those for whites. Since then, the relative income posi-
tion of nonwhite to white families has improved, but we have little information
about what portion of this change reflected "tightening" in the labor market as
opposed to secular growth. We do not know why returns to schooling were so
much less for blacks or whether they still are. If it was the effects of inferior
segregated schooling, we cannot be certain of the effects of compensation in terms
of similar expenditures alongside of de facto segregation. Perhaps the 1970 Census
will signal rapid improvement, but if not, the question of mobility alternatives
available to those who are economically depressed will be even more pressing.
There are numerous researchable questions related to the distribution of
opportunities for mobility when opportunities are defined not so much as suppiy
costs but in terms of responses or economic returns to given efforts or investments.
In addition to the distribution of opportunities among various socioeconomic
groups there is the question of the level of this distribution. In regard to the returns
to schooling, what factors determine the population mean? Obviously the organi-
zation of an economy for growth should be related to the profitability of alterna-
tive investments. But what determines the profitability of educational invest-
ments? There is recent evidence pertaining to elasticities of substitution between
laborers classified by school-related skill levels. But, there is only scant informa-
tion pertaining to substitution relations between labor-skill classes and various
forms of capital.
It is said that the division of labor is related to the extent of the market. Let me
offer a corollary: The complexity of a market as measured by the degree of product
and input differentiation is also limited by the extent of the market. That is,
there are informational scale diseconomies in market "size." Ceteris paribus, the
larger and the more developed the market and the more rapidly the market is
developing, the greater is the information necessary to function efficiently in the
ordinary business of life. If this is true, and if schooling is in part a ground for
developing ways of efficiently processing information, then the return to school-
ing is derived from these characteristics of the market. The question of factors
affecting the payoff to schooling is central to analyses of economic development.
In my opinion, we have disproportionately concentrated on ways in which educa-
tion "pays" and how this payoff can be measured, as though payoff schedules
are not themselves endogenous to an economic system.
There are obvious omissions to my suggestions for further research, but much
of what we will learn can, I think, be construed as falling in one of the classes of
problems discussed above. Yet, any discussion of future research directions would
be incomplete if it did not recognize a strong drift in social research toward
policy-specific analyses. For example, at least three Bureau-sponsored projects
now in progress or recently completed address the question of the effects of a
minimum wage. Also, a recent empirical analysis addressed the question of income
and substitution effects in labor supply functions for the working poor, which is
designed to provide parameter estimates that in turn will permit estimates of the
so-called disincentive effects of negative income tax schemes. At the present time
several staff members are involved in a project to assess possible future avenues
for research into aspects of poverty labor markets. Presumably, the Bureau's
future directions for research into poverty will be affected by this analysis.
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20THE NBER URBAN SIMULATION MODEL AND
URBAN ECONOMICS IN THE 1970's—John F. Kain
INTRODUCTION
Manyeconomists and others have assumed that urban economics is nothing more
than economists' observations about a variety of policy questions, such as poverty,
racial discrimination, low-income housing, transportation, and education. This
view is mistaken.
Urban economics has, or should have, a number of distinct analytical and theo-
retical foci. These are the determinants of the spatial distribution and location of
activities within urbanized areas, especially the individual and aggregate location
decisions of households and firms. The potential value øf urban economics to
public policy arises from the special insights it can provide about the ways in
which public policy either influences or is influenced by the location decisions of
firms, households, and other decision-making units within urbanized areas. To
provide these special insights, urban economics must develop a theory which
describes the determinants of urban spatial structure and the processes of urban
development.
Existing techniques of economic analysis are inadequate for the development
of such a theory. The weaknesses of existing theories of location and urban
structure arise from their need to resort to unrealistic assumptions about the dis-
tribution of employment in urban regions, the characteristics of housing and of
housing markets, and the interrelationships of workplaces and residences. These
unrealistic assumptions are needed to make the theory analytically tractable. The
calculus, the primary tool of microeconomics, is simply incapable of handling the
complexity of urban economic phenomena. As long as urban economics theory
continues to rely on the calculus, its progress will be painfully slow; and it will
never be able to deal adequately with a number of the central issues of urban
economics.
The apparent inadequacy of existing urban models and their inability to handle
important aspects of urban phenomena has led numerous researchers to consider
whether large computer simulation models might provide a means of developing
more satisfactory explanations of urban growth and development. The appeal of
large computer simulation models lies in their ability to handle far more complex
systems and to employ more elaborate and realistic assumptions.. It may be pos-
sible by iterative techniques to solve problems that could not be solved by existing
analytical methods.
This possibility led John Meyer and me to propose the design of a large scale
urban simulation model over ten years ago as part of a RAND Corporation study
of urban transportation sponsored by the Ford Foundation.1 Our sketch of a com-
puter simulation model of urban growth and development was one of several
roughly simultaneous efforts to formulate such a model. Subsequently various
efforts were made to construct computer simulation models in a number of metro-
politan areas, generally as part of comprehensive urban transportation studies.
Nom: Building a computer simulation model of the kind represented by the NBER
Urban Simulation Model is a complex undertaking requiring a diverse set of skills and
the efforts of a large number of individuals. All members of the NBER Urban Studies
Group participated. However, Gregory Ingram, Royce Ginn, H. James Brown, and I
were primarily responsible for the design, programming, and implementation of the
model. Stephen Dresch played a major role in estimating the critical submarket demand
equations for the model. The contributions of John R. Meyer, as usual, are both major
and difficult to describe. Mahion Straszheim, Stephen Mayo, Daniel Fredland, Elizabeth
Pinkston, Robert Goldberg, John Quigley, Joseph Persky, and Irving Silver also made
valuable contributions during the two and one-half years the model was under de-
velopment.
'F. Kain and John R. Meyer, "A First Approximation to a RAND Model for Study of
Urban Transportation," The RAND Corporation Memorandum RM-2878-FF, October 1961.
21These models never lived up to the promises of their most enthusiastic proponents,
and the sponsors were often disappointed by the results. As a result, urban simu-
lation models are somewhat out of fashion.
The disillusionment with urban simulation models resulted in large measure
from unrealistic expectations about what could be quickly learned from them,
serious underestimates of the difficulties of constructing truly useful models, and
the lack of adequate, long-term financial support for their development. It has long
been evident to researchers that to build a truly useful urban simulation model
would be exceedingly difficult, expensive, and time-consuming.
Inadequate theory and empirical knowledge about urban phenomena, limita-
tions of computer technology, and lack of financial support for the modeling
project prevented us from completing our proposed urban simulation model at
RAND. Our interest continued, however, and in the ensuing years research on
urban phenomena increased the base of theory and empirical knowledge, and
computers increased in size and speed. A grant from the Department of Housing
and -Urban Development to the National Bureau of Economic Research in the
spring of 1968 eased the budgetary constraint, and we began again to develop an
urban simulation model.
Last fall we completed programming, preliminary calibration, and initial runs
of the NBER Urban Simulation Model. Our experience in constructing the model,
the growing knowledge of firm and household behavior, and the rapid growth in
computer technology make me exceedingly optimistic about the contribution that
large computer simulation models can make to economics and particularly to
urban economics. Such models have the potential to revolutionize urban eco-
nomics in the decade of the 1970's. The discussion of the NBER model that follows
and the manner in which it corrects a number of the most serious deficiencies of
existing theories of location and urban structure should make evident the reasons
for my optimism.
ABRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE NBER MODEL2
TheNBER Urban Simulation Model is a generalized, policy-impact model based
on empirical research for a large number of cities; it represents those aspects of
firm, household, and market behavior common to all cities. The current version of
the model makes extensive use of data on Detroit during 1960-63. However, the
model city is not Detroit. We needed a reasonably consistent description of a city
in terms of employment, population, housing, housing prices, and transit and
highway networks to begin the simulations. Detroit was a convenient source of
data for this purpose, although not entirely satisfactory.
The hypothetical metropolitan region included in the current version of the
NBER model is divided into nineteen workplace and forty-four residence zones.
The model city contains only employed households, and each household has only
a single worker employed at one of the nineteen workplaces. Each household in
the model city belongs to one of seventy-two household classes, defined in terms of
family size, family income, and the education and age of the head. Each household
lives in one of twenty-seven distinct types of housing, defined in terms of struc-
ture type, number of rooms, quality, and lot size. The worker travels to and from
his workplace by one of two modes of travel. The modes are depicted in terms
of interzonal travel time and cost.
The model is designed to simulate major changes in urban spatial structure that
occur over periods ranging from ten to fifty years. Our principal theoretical inter-
2Amore detailed description of the model is contained in: Gregory Ingram, J. Royce Ginn,
H. James Brown, and John F. Kain, The NBER Urban Simulation Model: Vol. 1: "The Model
Description," Report to the Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Urban
Transportation Development and Liaison, Division of Systems Research and Development,
December 1970.
22est is with the effects on the spatial structure of urban areas of long-term trends
in the level and spatial distribution of employment, of changes in transportation
technology, of increases in income, and of the growth in employment and popu-
lation. Our principal policy concern is with the indirect and relatively long-term
impacts of various public policies on urban spatial structure, on investments in
residential and nonresidential capital, and on changes in the characteristics of
neighborhoods. Other important policy concerns, such as racial discrimination in
housing markets, could not be incorporated in this version of the model for rea-
sons discussed later in this paper.
The model begins with a description of the spatial structure of the model city
at a point in time and modifies this structure over a period of years by simulating
the location and investment decisions of firms, households, and housing suppliers.
The number of years covered by the simulation and the period of time repre-
sented by each iteration depend on the objectives of the simulation. For both tech-
nical and budgetary reasons, the period of time represented by each iteration will
usually be greater for longer simulated periods. If we are interested in the effects
of particular policies within a ten-year period, each iteration of the model would
probably represent a year. However, if we are interested in the effects of a policy
or major public investment over a period of twenty or thirty years, each iteration
might represent two years or more.
The NBER model differs from previous urban simulation models in several
respects. The most important is its explicit representation of the structure and
behavior of the housing market. Previous models have represented household
location decisions and changes in urban spatial structure by elaborate statistical
descriptions, usually with little or no theoretical justification. Market behavior
may be implicit in these empirical regularities; however, concepts such as supply
and demand, and prices are rarely included in the models. During each iteration
period, the NBER model simulates most of the important types of behavior which
influence urban spatial structure. These include: (1) household decisions to move;
(2)determinationof housing prices by housing type and location; (3)thetypes
and location of housing selected by new and moving households; (4)filteringof
the housing stock from one quality stratum to another; (5)renovationand modifi-
cation of the housing stock; (6) the construction of new housing; (7)changesin
the pattern of interzonal travel to and from work.
The current version of the model obtains market prices for each of the twenty-
seven house types in the forty-four residence zones during each iteration, and uses
this price information in determining the demand by housing consumers for each
kind of housing in each residence area and the response of housing suppliers to
this demand. Housing prices and access costs influence the choice of both housing
type and location by new households, immigrants, and intrametropolitan movers.
The rate at which the housing stock in a particular neighborhood is improved or
allowed to decline in quality depends on the maintenance policies of both landlords
and resident owners. In the NBER model the choice of maintenance policies
depends on their relative profitability. Relative profitability, in turn, depends on
the relative prices of housing of each quality stratum in each neighborhood.
More substantial physical modifications of the existing housing stock, such as
the merging or conversion of existing structures and new construction, are simi-
larly based on the profit which housing suppliers can expect to obtain from engag-
ing in each kind of supply activity in each residence zone or neighborhood. Prices
determine how much a housing supplier can expect to obtain from the sale of each
kind of housing in each neighborhood.
During each iteration, the model seeks to satisfy a target demand for each type
of housing, including a normal vacancy rate. Vacancies can fall below this normal
level either because the provision of some housing types is not profitable enough
or because large numbers of a particular kind of unit are transformed into other
kinds. The result will be an increase in the price of these units in the next period.
23The model is designed to assess the spatial implications of exogenously specified
employment distributions. It is not designed to assess the effects on industry loca-
tion, of changes in the distribution of households, or even to evaluate the effects on
industry location of changes in technology, income, and tastes.
It is likely that later generations of the model will handle population-serving
employment endogenously. Population-serving employment is that one-third of
total metropolitan employment that serves the resident population, e.g., employ-
ment in convenience retailing, public schools, and personal services. The location
of these activities bears a predictable relation to the population of each residence
zone. As a result it is fairly easy to add this feature to the model.
By contrast, we have no plans to make the location of basic employment—e.g.,
manufacturing, wholesaling, and other exporting activities—endogenous in the
foreseeable future. Furthermore, we do not see how it could be done with present
knowledge about the determinants of industry location. Our assessment of the
available evidence suggests that, while the location of basic employment has a
strong influence on the residential location decisions of individual households,
as well as on the prices of land and housing, the density of urban development,
and on other aspects of the spatial structure of urban areas, it is not in turn
strongly dependent on the spatial distribution of the residential population. In
short, we do not believe that the location decisions of basic industry are influenced
by residential location decisions and housing market behavior to an extent that
would justify making the location of nonpopulation-serving industry endogenous.
And if a significant dependence exists, our understanding of it is too limited to
dignify with an explicit representation in the model. Still, we regard an under-
standing of industry location as a fundamental building block for a complete
theory of urban growth and development, and we are therefore analyzing changes
in the location of manufacturing employment in several cities.3 As this research
increases our knowledge of the determinants of industry location, we will be able
to use the NBER model to examine the consequences of employment changes for
the location decisions and commuting patterns of urban for the
behavior of the urban housing market, and for the spatial structure of metropoli-
tan areas.
RELATIONTO EARLIER STUDIES
TheNBER model is perhaps best viewed as a hybrid of the empirically based com-
puter simulation models used during the past ten years in land-use—transportation
studies and the economic theories of location and urban spatial structure devel-
oped by urban economists during roughly the same period.4 Both kinds of models
have improved our understanding of the processes of urban development, but
both are seriously deficient in a number of important respects. One reason is that
there has been relatively little cross fertilization between these two model-building
traditions.
Engineers and planners, the principal architects of most previous urban simula-
tion models, have based their models on empirical regularities obtained from the
analysis of large surveys, with little or no consideration of the theoretical prob-
lems emphasized in economic theories of location and urban structure. In the same
way urban economists have paid scant attention to the descriptions of empirical
reality constructed by model builders for urban transportation studies.
Franklin J. James and Raymond J. Struyk, "Recent Trends in Industrial Composition and
Location," in John F. Kain, editor, The NBER Urban Simulation Model: Vol. II: "Supporting
Empirical Studies," Report to the Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of
Urban Transportation Development and Liaison, Division of Systems Research and Develop-
ment, December 1970.
'A survey and critique of the land-use models developed for five of these studies is presented
in Brown, et a!., "A Survey of Empirical Models of Urban Land Use: Suggestions on Research
Objectives and Organization," National Bureau of Economic Research, forthcoming.
24An important exception was the Herbert-Stevens model.5 John Herbert and
Benjamin Stevens proposed using a linear programming algorithm as the basis
of a residential location model for the Penn-Jersey Transportation Study. They
conceived of their linear programming model as a direct analog to the utility maxi-
mizing behavior assumed in economic theories of location and urban structure.
Britton Harris, Vladimir Almendinger, and others on the Penn-Jersey study made
strenuous efforts to implement the Herbert-Stevens model,° but their efforts
revealed a number of unsolved theoretical problems. These difficulties, com-
bined with the immense data and computational requirements of the model, forced
the Penn-Jersey study to abandon the linear programming framework in favor of
a more conventional empirical statistical land-use model. Britton Harris has con-
tinued to refine the approach proposed by Herbert and Stevens, but it is our
impression that several problems remain unresolved.
ECONOMICTHEORIES 01 LOCATION AND URBAN SPATIAL STRUCTURE
TheNBER model differs from the recent theories of location and urban spatial
structure principally in terms of the greater realism of its assumptions and its far
more detailed representation of urban structure. For these characteristics it owes
much to the urban simulation models developed by transportation planners.
All economic models of residential location and of urban spatial structure depict
the location decisions of urban households as resulting from utility-maximizing
behavior.7 Specifically, those models assume that a household chooses that resi-
dential location which maximizes its real income. This behavioral assumption, as
well as the assumptions that all employment is located in the center and that
monthly travel outlays increase as the distance between work and home increases,
permits the authors of these theories to generalize about the locational patterns of
different income groups and the spatial configuration of housing prices and
density. Although these theories pay less attention to the determinants of indus-
try location, firms are also depicted as choosing that location within the metro-
politan region that maximizes their profits.
The several models differ in their precise formulation of the problem. In every
case, however, competition for sites more accessible to the center produces a
systematic decline in the price of urban land with distance from the core. These
rent gradients and the greater travel costs required to reach more distant residence
locations interact to influence both the location of particular households and the
intensity of residential development. In the typical theoretical treatment, house-
holds consuming larger amounts of urban land find it advantageous to commute
long distances from the single employment center to outlying residences. House-
holds consuming smaller amounts of land or having unusually high transportation
costs find that the savings from cheaper peripheral land are too small to justify
the long trips required. Higher land prices cause households and firms to use land
more intensively. Land prices decline with distance from the center; therefore,
densities also decline.
These models have widespread acceptance. Many persons believe that they pro-
John Herbert and Benjamin Stevens, "A Model for the Distribution of Residential Activity
in Urban Areas," Journal of Regional Science, Vol. II, No. 2, Fall 1960, PP. 21-36.
V. V. Almendirtger, "Topics in the Regional Growth: I" (Penn-Jersey Transportation Study,
PJ Paper No. 4, Philadelphia, 1961); Britton Harris, "Linear Programming and the Projection of
Land Use" (PJ Paper No. 20, 1963).
For example: William Alonso, Location and Land Use (Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
1964); John F. Kain, "The Journey-to--Work as a Determinant of Residential Location" (Papers
and Proceedings of the Regional Science Association, Vol. IX, 1962, pp. 137-161); Edwin S. Mills,
"An Aggregative Model of Resource Allocation in a Metropolitan Area" (American Economic
Review, May 1967, pp. 197-211); Richard Muth, Cities and HouéinE (University of Chicago
Press, Chicago, 1969); Lowdon Wingo, Jr., Transportation and Urban Land (Resources for the
Future, Inc., Washington, D. C., 1961).
25vide satisfactory explanations of the geographic stratification of different income
groups and of density gradients at any moment in time as well as changes in these
distributions over time. For example, the tendency for low-income households
to locate in the central parts of cities is attributed to the lesser quantity of housing
they consume. The existence of slums is explained as the natural result of market
forces and of the tendency of centrally employed low-income households to spend
too little on housing maintenance. Historical declines in the level and density of
population in central areas and increases in the level and density of suburban areas
are alleged to be the result of secular increases in incomes and of declines in the
cost of passenger transportation.
These models have provided useful insights about the determinants of resi-
dential location and the behavior of urban housing markets, and there is undoubt-
edly a good deal of truth in their conclusions about the determinants of central
city declines in population, the suburbanization of urban households, and the
creation of slums. However, closer examination of these models, and especially
the comparison of their asumptions with empirical reality, raises serious doubts
about their completeness.
Any theory must abstract from and simplify reality in order to make the world
understandable. Indeed, this is the essence of good theory. However, the admis-
sion that simplifying assumptions are both desirable and necessary does not mean
that the realism of a model's assumptions should be ignored.
An appropriate test of an economic theory of location and urban spatial struc-
ture is its ability to explain historical patterns of urban development. There have
been a number of ingenious attempts to test these theories empirically, and many
persons believe these tests substantiate the theories.8 Unfortunately, the tests are
too primitive and do not provide a measure of the extent of correspondence be-
tween theory and reality.
In our view, the theories are particularly vulnerable on three counts:
1. They assume that all production takes place at a single location.
2. Because they obtain only long-run equilibrium solutions, they ignore capital
stocks entirely and fail to consider the effects of heterogeneous, durable, and loca-
tionally fixed capital.
3. They make no effort to acknowledge various kinds of interdependence that
appear to be important in urban housing markets. These include housing con-
sumption and production externalities, racial segregation and discrimination, and
the provision of local public goods.
The current version of the NBER model deals explicitly with the first two
problems. More advanced versions of the model will deal with the third set of
issues. As a consequence, it is useful to view the NBER model as an economic
theory of residential location and urban spatial structure which includes a large
number of spatially separate workplaces and which explicitly incorporates durable
and heterogeneous stocks of residential capital.
THEMONOCENTRIC ASSUMPTION
Theassumption that all production takes place at a single center is acknowledged
by its authors as lacking in realism, and all of them attempt to incorporate some
noncentral employment into their models. The most common assumption is to
define a category of local workers, who presumably provide services to the neigh-
borhood. The inclusion of these local workers into the model cannot, however,
be regarded as a meaningful departure from the monocentric assumption, since
the behavior of these local workers is considered only in the most trivial way, and
their inclusion has no effect on the solutions obtained from the theories.
8Themost elaborate tests are by Muth, op. cit. Other evidence is contained in Mills, "Urban
Density Functions," Urban Studies, Vol. 7,No.1,February1970.
26If the comprehensive urban transportation studies of the postwar period have
done anything, they have made clear the inappropriateness of the monocentric
assumption. It is rare that as much as 10 per cent of all employment is located in
the core or central business district, and the central city will often contain less
than half of all metropolitan employment. In 1963,52per cent of all manufactur-
ing and 29 per cent of all wholesaling employment in forty of the largest metro-
politan areas was found outside the central city. The fractions are still larger today.
The prevailing trend over the past half century has been a relative, often abso-
lute, decline in central employment and a rapid growth of jobs in suburban areas.
Theories that claim to explain the suburbanization of urban populations, changes
in the length of the journey-to-work, and modifications of central and suburban
densities, without explicit references to these changes in the distribution of
employment, must be viewed with suspicion. Many of the past changes in urban
structure which these theories attribute to increases in incomes and to declines in
the real costs of transportation, may instead be the result of changes in employ-
ment location. Existing empirical tests of the theories do not distinguish between
these explanations.
The NBER model, in the tradition of economic models of residential location,
assumes that a household chooses that housing type and location that maximize
its real income. The household bases its decision on the combined housing and
transport costs it would incur in consuming each type of housing. These combined
costs, or residential expenditure amounts, are the expected sum of outlays for the
journey to work, including both money and time expenditures, and housing
expenditures. Each household employed at each workplace estimates the expected
residential expenditure required to consume each of the different kinds of housing.
The prices represented by these combined costs are used in econometrically esti-
mated housing demand functions which determine the kinds of housing members
of each household class purchase.° These prices, which differ from one workplace
to another, explain the tendency for workers employed in suburban workplaces
to live at lower densities than workers with similar incomes and other characteris-
tics employed at central workplaces.1°
As indicated earlier, the current version of the NBER model takes the approxi-
mate distribution of employment in Detroit in 1963 as the starting point in obtain-
ing location solutions for single worker households employed at nineteen spatially
separate workplaces and produces housing prices for each of forty-four residence
areas. This exceedingly large and complex problem cannot be solved analytically
with existing methods. However, problems of this kind can be solved by iterative
techniques using the computational power of high-speed computers. We have
The demand equations used in the current version of the NBER Urban Simulation Model are
based principally on the research of Stephen Dresch, using data from the Detroit TALUS Study.
(Stephen P. Dresch, "The Demand Model: Theoretical and Empirical Foundations," Chapter 2
ofthe NBER Urban Simulation Model: Vol. II, op. cit.) Jim Brown and I obtained generally
consistent and supportive results using the supplementary home interview study of San Fran-
cisco, collected by BATS. (H. James Brown and John F. Kain, "Submarket Demand Equations
for San Francisco," ibid., Chapter 3.) Mahlon Straszheim, using a somewhat different approach,
obtained findings which generally support the approach used in the model and suggest a num-
ber of in which the current model design might be improved and modffied. (Mahion R.
Straszhéim, "The Demand for Residential Housing Services, Housing Markets, and Metro-
politan Development," ibid., Chapter 4.)
Serious data problems magnified the theoretical and estimation problems inherent in calculat-
ing the submarket demand functions. Although data from the Pittsburgh Transportation Study
appeared to be the most suitable, they did not become available until June 1970—too late to be
used for the current version of the model. There would probably be substantial advantages in
shifting to a Pittsburgh data base for further model development.
10John F. Kain, "The Journey-to-Work as a Determinant of Residential Location," op. cit.;
John R. Meyer, John F. Kain, and Martin Wohi, The Urban Trans pprtation Problem, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, 1965; John F. Kain, "A Contribution to. the Urban Transportation
Debate: An Econometric Model of Urban Residential and Travel Behavior," The Review of
Economics and Statistics, February 1964.
27used a linear programming algorithm to help us solve the problem.1' When we
began work on the NBER model, we regarded the use of linear programming as
appealing but impractical. After considering and discarding a number of alterna-
tive approaches, however, we conceived of an operationally feasible way of using
linear programming, both to locate individual households and to provide location
rents by housing submarket.
We made the problem computationally feasible by breaking it into two parts.
Households employed at specified workplaces are first allocated to housing sub-
markets (housing types) using the submarket demand equations; then the house-
holds competing in each of the housing submarkets are allocated to specific resi-
dence areas by means of linear programming. All households competing in each
housing submarket, employed at spatially distinct workplaces, are located in the
several residence areas so that total journey-to-work costs are minimized.
The linear programming solutions provide two critical kinds of information for
the model: (1)thenumber of worktrips between each workplace and residence
zone for households choosing residences during the period; and (2) shadow prices
for each type of housing in each residence zone. These shadow prices are averaged
over several years and are interpreted as estimates of market prices for the cur-
rent year. These current prices, which are used by housing demanders and sup-
pliers in making their decisions, provide the links between the choice of housing
types by households and the choice of residence areas, as well as the links between
the demand for housing by type and location and its supply.
HOUSINGSTOCKS AND LONG-RUN EQUILIBRIUM
Inaddition to evaluating the implications of relaxing the monocentric assump-
tion, the NBER model abandons the highly restrictive long-run equilibrium frame-
work which characterizes all existing economic theories of location. These theories
employ the method of comparative statics, which involves the analysis of the dis-
tribution of employment, population, income, -and other relevant characteristics
that would exist in long-run equilibrium. The long-run equilibrium state con-
sidered by these theories requires a full adjustment of the capital stock to any
changes in supply or demand conditions.
Long-run equilibrium models provide no information about the process of stock
adjustment or the time path of adjustment. The failure to consider explicitly these
dynamic adjustment mechanisms is a general weakness of economic theory and
analysis. However, because capital stocks are especially important for urban
housing markets, this weakness is particularly serious in the analysis of urban
development.
Stocks of nonresidential and residential capital in cities are seldom demolished
and replaced by new structures. Furthermore, these stocks have a powerful effect
both on the types of new investment and on its location. New construction will be
concentrated on those types of housing services that are not easily or cheaply
produced from the existing stock of residential capital. Except when there are
compelling locational advantages, new construction will occur on vacant land—
most of which is found at the periphery of the built-up area. The result is that the
spatial distribution of housing capital of different types will depend on the timing
of development and will differ from that which would occur if the city were built
tie novo each year.
The NBER model explicitly represents stocks of residential capital. The model
does not obtain the long-run equilibrium distributions of residential capital con-
sistent with the existing levels and distributions of employment, incomes, and
other factors believed to influence the quantity and location of housing services
'1Use of linear programming algorithms as a way of solving the multiple workplace-multiple
residence problem was first proposed by Herbert and Stevens (op.Cit.). However,the approach
used in the NBER model is completely different from the one they proposed.
28consumed by urban households. Instead, it obtains estimates of the desired demand
for housing by type and location during each time period, and modifies the existing
stock through maintenance, renovation, repair, and new construction. Moreover,
the prices that determine the desired demand in each period are not long-run equi-
librium suppiy prices, but rather a set of market prices that reflect the composition
and location of existing stocks of residential capital.
HETEROGENEITYOF THE STOCK
Amajor advantage of the long-run equilibrium assumption is that it permits the
theorists to ignore all aspects of the heterogeneity of housing except location and
price. In the long run, any kind of housing can be produced at any location
within the metropolitan area at its long-run supply price. Since nonland factors of
production are assumed to cost the same everywhere in the metropolitan area,
housing prices vary from one part of the region to another only because land prices
differ. However, once durable stocks are included in the model, this condition no
longer holds; and no simple relationship exists between the price of various types
of housing and their location within the region.
The NBER model permits the relative prices of different types of housing
bundles to vary from one part of the region to another. At most, existing economic
theories of location recognize only two attributes of housing services: accessibility
to the center and the quantity of residential space consumed. However, it is appar-
ent that the bundles of residential services consumed by urban households consist
of a large number of additional attributes. Many of these attributes are difficult
to modify by the actions of individual property owners and require collective
action.
Economic theories of location and urban structure obtain only a single price
gradient for urban land. Empirical research by Mahion Straszheim, however,
indicates that the situation is far more complex than these theories assume.12
Straszheim's results strongly suggest that there are different price gradients for
different attributes of the bundle of residential services.
The NBER model defines a series of housing submarkets in each of which
housing services are assumed to be homogeneous. The present version contains
twenty-seven distinct submarkets defined in terms of structure type, number of
rooms, and dwelling unit/neighborhood quality.13
PROBLEMSOF INTERDEPENDENCE
Especiallyvexing problems of heterogeneity arise from consumption externalities,
from the public provision of local public goods, and from other so-called neighbor-
hood effects. As analyses by John Quigley and me indicate, attributes of the bundle
of residential services that are in some sense external to the particular property or
dwelling unit, (i.e., the quality of local public schools, neighborhood crime, neigh-
borhood prestige, etc.) appear to be as important as attributes of the dwelling unit
itself (i.e., size, condition, number of rooms, etc.).
Existing economic theories of location and urban structure ignore these external
dimensions of the bundle of residential services. Unfortunately, the lack of ade-
quate theory, the paucity of persuasive empirical evidence about how these attri-
butes are produced and how they influence household behavior, and model-build-
ing priorities have prevented a satisfactory representation of them in the present
'9Mahlon R. Straszheim, "The Demand for Residential Housing Services, Housing Markets,
and Metropolitan Development," NBER Urban Simulation Model, Vol. II, Chapter 4.
"housingsubmarket definitions used in the present versioft of the NBER model must be
regarded as highly tentative. We suspect the model's performance. would be greatly improved
by better submarket definitions. The best way to accomplish this difficult and complex task is
still unclear, but we are actively researching this area.
29version of the NBER model. However, research on household demand for these
attributes and on the determinants of their supply has been a prominent part of
all our econometric studies of the housing market. Moreover, the NBER model has
great potential for testing various hypotheses about the relationship between indi-
vidual and aggregate location decisions. For example, when an individual house-
hold makes location decisions, it is influenced by its perception of the present and
anticipated quality of public goods in various jurisdictions. But it is just as evident
that the quality and types of public goods in a jurisdiction depend on the charac-
teristics of past and present residents of that community. Heretofore, no suitable
models have existed for considering these kinds of interdependencies. The NBER
model seems ideal to study the interpendence between the demand for and provi-
sion of local public goods.
Racial discrimination in urban housing markets is an obvious and particularly
important type of interdependence. The fact that it is not included in the present
version of the NBER model results from model-building priorities rather than our
evaluation of what is most important. Before introducing any additional complexi-
ties, even one as important as housing market discrimination, it was first necessary
to have a basic market model. We have, however, several ideas about how we
might represent housing market discrimination in the model, and we regard this
extension of the model of highest priority. If these ideas prove fruitful, the use of
the NBER model to evaluate the consequences of discrimination could be its most
valuable contribution.
CONCWS1ON
TheNBER Urban Simulation Model should provide valuable insights about the
probable effects of a wide variety of proposed public policies. For example, we
should be able to evaluate the effects of alternative transport investments on the
location decisions of urban households, on the kinds of housing they consume,
and on the density and structure of urban development. Similarly, the model
should be useful for evaluating a wide variety of housing programs. Among the
most important of these are programs, such as rent supplements, that seek to im-
prove housing conditions by increasing the purchasing power of low-income
households. A central concern about these proposals is that the subsidies may not
increase the supply of housing; they may simply increase prices and enrich exist-
ing property owners.
A variety of other programs—most notably the urban renewal and model
cities programs—are concerned less with improving housing standards generally
than with improving the quality of particular communities or neighborhoods. The
NBER model, with its emphasis on the spatial dimensions of the housing market,
is ideally suited for evaluating both the direct and indirect consequences of such
programs.
It would be misleading, however, to suggest that the current version of the
NBER model can provide satisfactory answers to these and similar questions. It
is still a crude and incomplete prototype. Moreover, the empirical estimates of
some of the functions included in the model are unsatisfactory.
The current version of the NBER model has been programmed for the IBM
360 computer and has been run on both IBM 360-67 and IBM 360-91 machines.
It is capable of simulating the behavior of households and of the housing market
in the way described; however, the results of the simulations are inadequate
representations of Detroit or of any other city. The problem is not the operation
of the model or its theoretical structure. The major source of difficulty is the lack
of some critical data for Detroit, the city we have relied most heavily on in
calibrating the model. These data problems can be circumvented to some extent.
To obtain satisfactory results, however, we may have to recalibrate the model for
Pittsburgh, San Francisco, or some other city where data problems are less severe.
30Perhaps the most important lesson to be gleaned from our efforts is that the
time of computer simulation models is here. When John Meyer and I proposed
the development of an urban simulation model at RAND, ten years ago, the
largest computer generally available was the IBM 7090. We estimate that to run
a single year's simulation of the NBER Urban Simulation Model on the IBM 7090
would have required at least four hours; to run the model on the 7094, the largest
computer in widespread use until a year or two ago, would have taken from
forty-five minutes to an hour of computer time and probably another 20 minutes
for tape storage. This assumes, of course, that enough core storage existed on
the 7090 and 7094 computers to run a model of this size, and that is not true
by a factor of two. In the late 1950's, a year's simulation with the NBER model
would have cost at least $7,200, assuming again that the model could have been
run at all. Today it costs less than $90 per simulated year on the IBM 360-67 and
$50 per simulated year on the 360-91.
Even a conservative projection of computer technology indicates that the only
barriers to the development of truly useful urban simulation models are our
ingenuity and technical know-how. The projected growth in computer capability,
more than any other factor, is the basis for my contention that computer simula-
tion models will revolutionalize urban economics in the next decade. If they do not,
we have failed to respond to the opportunity available to us.
31ECONOMIC MODELS OF FERTILITY: SOME EXAMPLES
AND IMPLICATIONS—Warren Sanderson and Robert J. Willis
Untilrecently, it has been difficult to ask many questions of economic theory
concerning household behavior because of the rigid characterization of the house-
hold in standard theory. In this theory, a household is characterized as an entity
which attempts to maximize its utility, subject to the constraint that its expendi-
tures on market goods not exceed its fixed income. It is obvious that an attempt
to apply economic theory to a phenomenon such as fertility will have to be made
largely outside the framework provided by this model. Outside of the model,
to name but a few things, are factors influencing family formation and composi-
tion, the division of labor within the household, supplies of labor by family mem-
bers to the market, educational and job choices by family members, child rearing
practices, methods of fertility control chosen and efficacy with which they are
used. Inside the model is mainly the postulate of rational economic behavior, the
principle of constrained maximization.
Recently, the capacity of economic theory to accommodate a more richly
specified structure of household tastes and constraints has been greatly advanced
by the work of Gary Becker [1] and, independently, Kelvin Lancaster [3]. This
work has made it possible to apply the postulate of rational, maximizing behavior
rigorously and flexibly to a wide range of problems, including fertility behavior.
Households, following Becker's development of the argument, cannot directly
satisfy their wants by the consumption of market goods, but instead use these
goods in combination with the time of household members to produce psychic
"commodities," which are the true object of consumer wants in the sense that
their "quantities" enter as arguments into the household utility function while
the quantities of market goods or members' time do not. The properties of house-
hold production functions by which inputs of goods and time are transformed
into commodities are governed by the state of consumer technology in exactly
the same sense that the properties of manufacturing production functions are said
to be governed by the state of manufacturing technology. The household obtains
its supplies of market goods either by spending nonlabor income or by with-
drawing the time of household members from home production, "exporting"
it to the labor market and, with the income earned thereby, "importing" market
goods. In the short run, the market wage rate obtained by each household member
may be regarded as parametric, being determined by the set of market wage rates
for persons of given characteristics. In the long run, however, a person may to
some extent choose some of his characteristics by building up or running down his
stock of human capital through investment in education, training, health, etc.,
which are themselves produced in the household with inputs of time and goods.
The relationship between a person's market productivity and his stocks of various
types of human capital may be termed his "earnings function."
The structure of the household, in Becker's theory, thus consists of (1) the
household utility function whose arguments are quantities of psychic commodi-
ties, (2) the household production functions by which inputs of members' time
and market goods are transformed into commodities and additions to stocks of
human capital, and (3) the earnings functions of each household member which
relate his stocks of human capital to his market earnings, given the set of market
wage rates. The variables subject to household control (i.e., its control variables)
are (1) the quantities of commodities, (2) the quantities of time and goods inputs
to the production of each commodity and type of human capital, (3) the amounts
and distribution among members of each type of human capital, and (4) the quan-
tity of time each household member allocates to market work and to home work.
Finally, the "state" variables, which the household cannot control, are in two
groups: (1) variables whose values were determined by a past decision, such as
the amount of human or physical capital each has during a particular
32period and (2) variables which are outside the control of the household throughout
its life-cycle. Principally, these are each member's endowment of time and the
set of market prices for goods and labor.
The method of constrained maximization now provides the economist with a
very powerful tool with which to determine the implications of the assumptions
he has made about the household's structure. Basically, this method asks how
the economic actor should choose the values of the variables over which he has
control so as to maximize his utility, subject to the condition that he not violate
the set of constraint functions whose values, in turn, are determined by the set
of state variables not subject to his control. The answer to this question is obtained
by solving the maximization problem for the optimal value of each control variable
as a function of the values of each of the state variables. Each of these is a function
of household members' endowments of time and of the market prices for goods
and labor that the household will face during its lifetime. The nature of these
functions will depend on the assumed properties of the structural equations of
the model.
As any general-equilibrium theorist knows, the cost of an analytic framework
which incorporates every phenomenon is that it implies nothing about any par-
ticular phenomenon. Restrictions on the elements of the model and on the model
as a whole must be made, if it is to yield any implications. When such restric-
tions are made, the power of this approach to household behavior becomes very
great indeed. The analytic methods by which this framework may be applied to
actual phenomena are familiar to every economist. The model may be general or
partial equilibrium, dynamic or static, disaggregated or aggregated. The appropri-
ate technique to choose depends on interest.
The main point is that this model gives the economist a framework in which to
organize his knowledge about the structure of the household in such a way that
the implications of this knowledge for observed behavior can be derived rigorously
rather than heuristically. We hope to show by example that the use of rigorous
economic models can provide realistic implications for fertility behavior which
could not be obtained without an explicit model.
TIMEINTENSITY AND THE EFFECT OF INCOME ON FERTILITY
In[6], Willis proposed a model of completed fertility within the framework
provided by Becker's theory. The model assumes that a married couple, living
in a world of perfect fertility control and perfect foresight, chooses the number
and "quality" of its children and their own standard of living so as to maximize
their lifetime utility. The services of children and the parents' standard of living
are assumed to be psychic commodities produced within the home, with inputs of
the wife's time and market goods according to household production functions
whose properties are determined by the state of consumer technology.
Given the state of consumer technology, the household's consumption and
production possibilities are limited by the amount of the wife's time and of
market goods available to produce child services and the parents' standard of
living. The supply of the wife's time to home production is equal to her lifespan
after marriage minus the number of years she devotes to market work. The supply
of market goods is limited by the husband's lifetime income (he is assumed, for
simplicity, to work full time and his time at home is assumed to be unproductive)
plus the earnings of the wife equal to her market wage rate multiplied by her years
of market work. The composition of resources available to the household is,
therefore, subject to household control via the wife's supply of labor.
The wife's labor supply decision depends on a comparison between the produc-
tivity of her time in the household and the productivity of the market goods she
could earn by withdrawing time from home production. To produce commodities
efficiently, the wife will allocate her home work and market goods between chil-
33dren and the standard of living so as to equate the ratios of the marginal products
of time and goods.
These ratios, which determine the shadow price of the wife's time in the home,
are called the wife's home wage Wh. If W, her market wage, exceeds Wh, the wife
will supply labor to the market until Wh rises to equality with W. The home wage
rises because the ratio of goods to time in home production rises, causing the
marginal product of time to rise and the marginal product of goods to fall. Thus,
the working wife will adjust her supply of labor so as to keep her home wage
equal to her market wage. Assuming the market wage to be parametric, it follows
that the price of the working wife's time in home production is fixed and equal to
her market wage. In contrast, if the wife is supplying no labor to the market and
finds that Wh exceeds W, there is no way for her to increase her supply of home
time and reduce the supply of market goods in order to reduce Wh to equality
with W. Consequently, the price of the nonworking wife's time is endogenous to
the model and will, in general, be an increasing function of the amount of market
goods purchased with the husband's income, in the same way that the real wage
of labor tends to be an increasing function of capital-labor ratios in standard eco-
nomic models.
As it stands, this model has no particular implication for the fertility demand
function, the relationship between the optimal number of children and the exoge-
nous variables of the model, the husband's lifetime income and the wife's market
wage rate, because the structure of the model has not been sufficiently restricted.
In the major implications of the model followed from the assumption that the
household production functions for children and the standard of living were linear
and homogeneous and, most importantly, that children are always produced more
time-intensively than the standard of living. Given these two assumptions, it was
proved that there is a positive one-to-one correspondence between the home wage
of the wife and the opportunity cost of children in terms of the parents' standard
of living. The heuristic argument is quite simple. Given constant-returns produc-
tion functions, the opportunity cost of children in terms of the standard of living
is given by the unit costs of the time and goods devoted to children divided by
the unit costs of time and goods devoted to the standard of living, where the value
of time and goods are evaluated at equilibrium shadow prices. Now let the price
of the wife's time rise relative to the price of goods. Since children are more time-
intensive, their unit costs rise relative to the cost of the standard of living.
The implications of this time-intensity hypothesis for household fertility be-
havior can be outlined as follows. Assume that, if household resources increase
(holding the cost of children constant), the household will tend to increase its
fertility as well as its level of child quality and standard of living. Holding utility
constant, on the other hand, an increase in the opportunity cost of children will
tend to reduce fertility. It does not necessarily follow, however, that an increase in
the wife's market wage tends to reduce fertility and an increase in the husband's
income tends to increase fertility.
Holding the wife's wage constant, let her husband's lifetime income (H) in-
crease. Suppose, too, that at the initial low level of H the wife was working. As H
increases, the cost of children remains constant and the wife withdraws labor
from the market to keep Wh from rising above W, until she ceases work altogether.
In this phase, the husband's income has a positive effect on fertility. As H con-
tinues to increase after the wife has ceased working, however, the increase in her
home wage cannot be prevented by further additions of the wife's time to home
production. As W4 rises, the opportunity cost of children rises, causing sub-
stitution effects against fertility which may outweigh the income effects in favor
of fertility. Conversely, holding H constant at a high level, the market wage of
the nonworking wife may rise without affecting the home wage, until it rises high
enough to induce the wife back into the labor force. After that point, further
increases in W will tend to raise the cost of children and reduce fertility.
34Perhaps the most intriguing implication of the model for fertility is its sugges-
tion that the form of the relationship between the optimal number of children,
the husband's income, and the wife's potential market wage depends on whether
the value of the home wage is governed by the wife's market wage, as it is for
working wives, or whether it is governed by the husband's income, as it is for non-
working wives. In the former case, fertility will tend to be negatively related to W
and positively related to H while, in the latter case, the desired number of children
will tend to be unrelated to W and less positively or negatively related to H
depending on the relative strengths of the income and substitution effects.
A provisional attempt has been made to verify these implications. If our model
is correct, the effect of husband's income on fertility should depend on the level
of the wife's market wage, while the effect of the wife's wage should depend on
the level of the husband's income. The appropriate regression model to detect
such an effect, if it is present, contains an interaction term. We, therefore, esti-
mated a regression model of the following form:
N—a-FbH+cW+d(HXW),
where 8N/äH =b+ dW, and =c+ dH.
If the level of W is low, a wife will be less likely to work and the effect of H on
fertility is most likely to be negative because the positive correspondence between
H and Wh among nonworking wives results in a positive relationship between
H and P, the opportunity cost of children. Accordingly, we expect b possibly to be
negative while d must certainly be positive if the sign of the "true" income effect
on fertility is positive. An increase in the wife's potential market wage will raise
the opportunity cost of children and cause a substitution effect against fertility,
if the wife works. It is more likely that the wife will work, the lower is her
husband's lifetime income. Thus, we expect c to be negative.
This regression was run using data on the number of children ever born to
white women over thirty-five, married once with husband present, drawn from
the 1960 Census one-in-one-thousand sample and from a published tabulation
of a 5 per cent sample of North Central, urban, native-born couples, compiled by
Richard and Nancy Ruggles [5] from the 1940 Census. The parameters of the
"interaction" model were estimated from seven independent subsamples con-
sisting of three age groups of women from the 1960 Census (35-44, 45-54, and
55-64) and four from the 1940 Census (40-44, 45-49, 50-54,and55-59).
Theresults of these regressions can be used to test the proposition that the
regression coefficients within each age group are of the theoretically expected sign.
They may also be used to see if the relationship between fertility and household
economic status has remained stable over time.
The independent variables of the theoretical model are the husband's lifetime
income and the wife's permanent market wage. Since neither of these variables
can be observed in data, the husband's census-year income is used as a proxy
for H and the wife's years of education is used as a proxy for W. Each proxy
may be considered to measure the corresponding "true" variable with a random
error, with the result that the estimated regression coefficients will tend to be
biased. One way to reduce bias from "errors in the variable" is to use cell means
from grouped data instead of data on individuals when the grouping scheme is
chosen so as to be correlated with true variable(s), but uncorrelated with the
error(s) •1
SeeMalinvaud [4,pp.359-362J.Anempirical test of the magnitude and direction of this
bias was carried out by comparing the presumably unbiased coefficients estimated from grouped
data with the presumably biased coefficients estimated from individual observations on mem-
bers of the three age groups from the 1960one-in-one-thousandsample. Generally the coef-
ficients from the ungrouped regressions were smaller in absolute value than their counterparts
from the grouped regressions, indicating that the direction of bias was toward zero. The mag-
nitude of the bias over the three groups averaged about 50percent, 15percent, and 20percent
for the coefficients of H, W, and H xW,respectively.
35Following this strategy, the regressions with the 1960 data were run using mean
values of the husband's 1959 income for H and the wife's years of education W.
The data were cross-classified by seven husband's occupation classes (farmers
omitted), three husband's education classes, and five levels of wife's education.
The 1940 data were cross-classified by the wife's education (five classes) and the
husband's 1939 income (seven classes). The independent variables H and W were
assigned values equal to the midpoint of each category and the husband's 1939
income was multiplied by two in order to measure it in dollars of 1959 purchasing
power.
In addition to the interaction model with grouped data, we have run a non-
interaction model from the 1960 and 1940 Censuses by omitting the interaction
term H x W, to see if the resulting regression coefficients tend to be unstable
across successive cohorts. Such instability in the effects of H and W on fertility
might be expected on the basis of our theoretical model, given substantial inter-
cohort growth in average husband's income and wife's education.
The results of the noninteraction model are reported in Table I-i. The coeffi-
cient of W, the wife's years of education, is always negative and statistically
significant, a finding that supports our hypothesis that fertility declines as the
opportunity cost of children rises. The effect of income on fertility, according
to the results of these regressions appears to have a trend from negative to positive
across successive cohorts. The coefficient of husband's income (H) is negative
and statistically significant for the earliest cohort (1881-85), remains negative
and significant but declines in magnitude progressively for the cohorts (1886-90
to 1896-1900) represented in the 1940 Census, and becomes positive but insig-
nificant for the last two cohorts (1906-15 and 1916-25) from the 1960 Census.
Alternative interpretations of this trend in the magnitude of the "income effect"
are available. One is that the relationship between income and fertility is an un-
stable one that basically reflects the effects on fertility of omitted variables such
as birth control or tastes, which are correlated with income in the cross section
but change independently of income over time. Another is that the noninteraction
model misspecifies the way in which economic variables affect fertility. We may
examine the case for the second alternative by looking at the results of the inter-
action model suggested by our economic theory of fertility.
The results of the regressions using the interaction with grouped data
are also shown in the table.2 Each variable in every cohort regression coeff i-
cient of the expected sign and all are statistically significant. Thus, the sign of the
coefficient of the interaction term H x W is positive, the coefficient of H is negative,
and the coefficient of W is also negative. However, the numerical magnitudes of
the coefficients b, c,andd are remarkably stable from cohort to cohort.
The empirical implications of the interaction model for the effects of economic
growth on fertility trends and differentials depend on (1) the stability of the pa-
rameters of the fertility demand function across cohorts and (2) the direction and
magnitude of the effects of H and W on the fertility of various population groups.
Both of these questions may be examined in Chart I-lA and Chart I-lB in which,
respectively, are plotted aN/t9W =c +dH and b + dW, using the values
reported in the table for the regression coefficients b, c,andd for the seven age
groups from the 1940 and 1960 Census samples. These plots vividly portray the
high degree of stability of these parameters across the birth cohorts 1881-85 to
1916-25. This stability in the face of the substantial growth in average levels of
husbands' incomes and wives' years of education and the substantial variation
in other conditions faced by these cohorts suggests that it may be possible to apply
our model to the explanation of trends in cohort fertility as well as to the ex-
planation of cross-section fertility differentials within cohorts.
2Each cell was weighted by the square root of the number of women in the cell in order to
have a homoscedastic error term. See Malinvaud [4,pp.242-245].
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Interaction and Noninteraction Regression Results








Cohort Census(in $10,000) Education Term Constant R2
1960 Census
1916-1925 35-44
Noninteraction model 0.2177 —0.0892 — 3.397 0.327
(1.46) (6.07)
Interaction model —2.1135 —0.1892 0.1723 4.724 0.436
(3.93) (7.25) (4.48)
1906-1915 45-54
Noninteraction model 0.0400 —0.1181 3.466 0.475
(0.26) (7.27)
Interaction model —2.4622 —0.2153 0.1821 4.776 0.586
(4.91) (9.09) (5.18)
1896-1905 55-64
Noninteractionmodel —0.7072 —0.1212 3.940 0.672
(4.41) (7.90)




Noninteraction model —0.2224 —0.0895 3.138 0.643
(1.74) (6.36)
Interaction model —1.7864 —0.1386 0.1361 3.670 0.728
(3.63) (7.13) (3.26)
1891-1895 45-49
Noninteractjon model —0.4292 —0.1148 3.622 0.663
(2.70) (6.23)
Interaction model —2.6246 —0.1876 0.1974 4.378 0.897
(5.10) (8.48) (4.40)
1886-1890 50-54
Noninteraction model —0.4626 —0.1195 3.734 0.561
(2.29) (4.85)
Interaction model —2.6983 —0.2000 0.2098 4.516 0.687
(4.28) (6.63) (3.68)
1881-1885 55-59
Noninteraction model —0.7176 —0.0916 3.531 0.535
(3.38) (3.84)
Interaction model —3.1876 —0.1658 0.2262 4.279 0.655
(4.22) (5.52) (3.37)
Year by year, secular economic growth has raised the market wage rates avail-
able to men and women so that the lifetime earnings capacities of husbands and
wives have tended to increase. Our theoretical model and the estimates of its
parameters can help us to understand the implications of secular growth in H and
W for changes in cohort fertility. In Chart I-lA, we can see that growth in W will
always tend to depress fertility because aN/OW is negative throughout the sample
range of H. In contrast, growth in H may either raise or lower fertility depending
on the level of W. In Chart I-1B, we can see that ON/OH is negative for values of W
less than about twelve years and positive for levels of the wife's schooling above
thirteen years. Thus, as the average level of W increases across cohorts, increasing
proportions of married couples in the population will tend to.raise their fertility
in response to an increase in H, holding W constant. At the aggregate level, the
sign of the partial effect of income increases on cohort fertility will change from
37negative to positive as the average level of W increases. This is illustrated by the
change in the sign of the coefficient of H in the noninteractionregressions from
negative to positive as the average level of W rose from about nineto eleven years
of education across the cohorts of 1881-85to1916-25.
Alterations in the pattern of fertility differentialsacross cohorts are also capable
of being explained, in part at least, by the results ofour regressions. Thus, the
"traditional" negative correlation of fertility with the socioeconomicstatus of
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Chart I-i
Partial Derivatives of Completed Fertility with Respect to Exogenous Variables
Implied by Interaction Regressions from 1960 and 1940 Censuses
A. Partial Derivative of Completed Fertility
with Respect to Wife's Years of Education 8N/SW
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B. Partial Derivative of Completed Fertility
8N/8H with Respect to Husband's Income
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20222426either husband or wife is consistent with a population of relatively low average
levels of H and W, in which both oN/OH and ON/OW are negative. As' the level
of W rises and ON/OH becomes positive for households containing well-educated
wives, income growth will tend to raise the fertility of these wives relative to that
of less well-educated women, as it did in the early postwar years of the baby boom.
As W continues to grow, a U-shaped pattern of fertility differentials emerges, in
which there is a negative relationship between socioeconomic status and fertility
among lower-status groups and a positive one among higher-status groups.
The assumption that children are time-intensive compared with other house-
hold activities, combined with a simple comparative static model of lifetime
household behavior, has been shown to yield implications that are consistent with
a variety of observed relationships between fertility and socioeconomic variables.
In the next section, we shall demonstrate that these implications largely remain
intact when the time-intensity assumption is applied to a dynamic model of house-
hold behavior, and that a variety of additional features of household behavior,
including the timing of births and of labor force activity by the husband and wife,
become subject to analysis and empirical verification.
TOWARDA LIFE-CYCLE MODEL OF FERTILITY
Thebasic framework of the economic model of fertility discussed above may be
incorporated into a life-cycle model of fertility behavior which has implications
for the spacing as well as the number of children. We have been experimenting
with a numerically specified dynamic model of utility maximization which is
solved using a successive-approximations dynamic programming technique. While
the results of our efforts with these models are still highly tentative and incom-
plete, our experience to date indicates that they hold great promise for modelling
fertility behavior. Although the life-cycle model is based upon the comparative
static model, there are some important differences that are worth noting. In the
life-cycle model, the husband's time and the wife's time are inputs into all house-
hold production functions and each child is treated as if it were a stock whose
value at any point in time depended on the value of the cumulated net investment
his parents have made in him. Investment in each child is produced via a series
of household production functions in which the goods-intensity rises and the
wife's time-intensity falls as the child grows older. Given the structure of house-
hold production, the utility functional, an exogenous life-cycle hourly wage path
for each parent, and an exogenous path of nonlabor income, the model determines
the optimal number and timing of children, the optimal amount of time each
parent spends in the labor market each year of married life, and, combining the
latter with the exogenous wage rates, the optimal path of family labor income.
Chart 1-2 illustrates the results of one experiment with the model. In that trial,
we assumed that both parents were nineteen years old when they married, that
their time horizon for childbearing decisions terminated at age sixty-four, that
they faced the exogenously given wage paths shown on the uppermost panel of
Chart 1-2, and that they had the exogenously given path of nonlabor income
shown in the next lower panel. The hourly wage-rate paths shown here roughly
represent the observed cross-sectional age-specific wage rates of college educated
people at the time of the 1960 Census. The lower two segments of Chart 1-2 show
life-cycle paths of hours of work and total family income, which are determined
by the model. The vertical lines indicate when children are born.
Chart 1-2 was one of three experiments designed to test the consistency of the
dynamic and static models. Since nonlabor income in the life-cycle model, and the
husband's permanent income in the static case represent comparable exogenous
income variables, the consistency of the models was investigated by comparing
the implications for fertility of changes in these variables. The results of these
three experiments are summarized on p. 41. Line 3 represents the situation shown
in Chart 1-2.
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40Annual Present Value of Number No. of Years
Line Nonlabor Total Family Income of Wife Participates
No. Income Discounted at 7.5% Childrenin Labor Market
1 —$5,000 $125,006 2 34
2 0 156,254 3 22
3 5,000 191,793 3 10
These trials show that the life-cycle and static models are consistent. As predicted
by the static theory, the positive effect on fertility of increasing nonlabor income
diminished as the wife's labor-force participation decreased. Although the con-
sistency for the two approaches is not surprising, it is encouraging since dynamic
models need not have implications similar to those of their static analogs.
Four more experiments were conducted to investigate the implications of the
life-cycle model for the effects of wage-rate changes on fertility. The hourly wage
rates used in these examples roughly represent the observed cross-sectional age-
specific wage rates of high school educated people at the time of the 1960 Census.
Let us define (A) as this hourly wage-rate path for the husband and (B) as the
hourly wage-rate path for the wife. The results of these trials are summarized
below.
Husband's Wife's Present Value of NumberNo. of Years Wife
LineWage-Rate Wage-RateTotal Family Income of Participates in
No. Path Path Discounted at 7.5% ChildrenLabor Market
1 10X(A) 0.1X(B) $999,132 1 0
2 $2+(A) $2+(B) 215,060 3 29
3 (A) (B) 120,257 2 30
4 0.1 X(A) 0.1 X(B) 10,903 3 20
Comparing line 3 with line 4,wesee that a large equiproportional upward shift
in wage-rate paths for both parents is associated with a decrease in the number of
offspring and an increase in the number of years the wife participates in the labor
market. Thus, the growth of male and female wage rates at a constant rate may be
sufficient to account for both a fertility decline and an increase in female labor-
force participation. This implication may be useful in explaining observed de-
creases in fertility.
The wage-rate paths denoted in lines 2 and 3 differ by $2.00 an hour for each
parent and each year of married life. In other words, moving from the situation
in line 3 to that in line 2 represents an equal arithmetic (as opposed to propor-
tional) shift in wage-rate paths. Since at each age the male's wage is higher than
the female's in the initial wage-rate sets, (A) and (B), the wife's wage rates grow
more rapidly than the husband's as we go from the situation indicated in line 3 to
that indicated in line 2. Similarly, since we have characterized both the husband's
and wife's wage rates as increasing monotonically with age, as we move from line 3
to line 2, both parent's wage rates grow more rapidly when they are younger than
when they are older. In this particular case, these wage-rate changes lead to an
increase in fertility and to a slight decrease in the number of years the wife par-
ticipates in the labor market.
Line 1 represents a situation in which the husband has a relatively high market
wage rate and the wife a relatively low one. This circumstance was chosen to
investigate whether the dynamic and the static models were consistent in the
implication that families in which the husband's income was very high would tend
to have relatively few children. Line 1 does, indeed, show that this comparatively
wealthy couple has only one child and that the wife never works in the labor
market. Comparing lines 1 and 4, it is possible to see an example of the point we
made in discussing the static model, that increasing the husband's income alone
can, under certain circumstances, be associated with a decline in fertility.
In addition to the trials described above, we have varied parameters of the
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values of fertility control costs. Space does not allow a discussion of these tests.
It is our aim to broaden the dynamic model presented here and, with parameters
estimated from United States experience, to investigate whether the explicit aggre-
gation of predicted life-cycle patterns of fertility and labor-force participation can
aid in our understanding of these complex phenomena.
CONCLUSION
Theeconomic theory discussed in this paper may be elaborated in a large variety
of ways. We have already shown that the one-period, lifetime framework of the
static model could be recast into a multiperiod, life-cycle framework, thereby
broadening the scope of the model. The broader model includes implications for
the spacing of children as well as for their numbers, and for the time paths of the
husband's and wife's labor-force participation as well as for their total lifetime
hours. The scope of the model, within either the static or dynamic framework,
may be further broadened to include other aspects of household behavior by add-
ing additional equations to the production structure of the model. For example,
the paths of the husband's and wife's wage rates, which are treated as exogenous
in this paper, may be explained endogenously by adding earnings functions in
which the market wage available to a person of a given age depends on his educa-
tion and experience in the labor force. Since labor-force activity is subject to
choice, the market wage becomes endogenous and is chosen simultaneously with
hours of work and fertility. Another example would be the addition of a fertility
control function that makes the expected number of children depend on the effort
devoted to reducing fertility below its "natural" level.
Given the scope of the model, alternative assumptions may be made about the
form and arguments of the structural equations, which may result in alternative
hypotheses about the effect of these variables on observed behavior. For example,
in our regressions we have already tested the hypothesis that children are more
time-intensive than other household activities against the alternative that children
are equally or less time-intensive. It would also be possible to investigate the impli-
cations of assuming that household production functions shift in a particular way
with the education of household members, that returns to scale have a particular
pattern, or that market goods are disaggregated in some way.
The theory, then, provides a skeletal framework or structure upon which theo-
retical and empirical investigations of lifetime or life-cycle household behavior
may be based and in light of which other work in the area may be evaluated. Given
the wide variety of observed relationships between economic variables and fer-
tility, it is easy to be skeptical about the relevance of economics to fertility re-
search. We have shown in this paper that economic models of fertility imply con-
nections between these variables and fertility as varied as those we observe.
Despite their promise, however, the models discussed in this paper should be
regarded merely as examples, drawn from research in progress, of how economics
may help us to understand fertility behavior.
REFERENCES
1.Becker, Gary S., "A Theory of the Allocation of Time." Economic Journal, Septem-
ber1965.
2. Johnston, J., Econometric Methods. McGraw-Hill, New York, 1963.
3. Lancaster, Kelvin, "A New Approach to Consumer Theory." Journal of Political
Economy, 1966.
4. Malinvaud, E., Statistical Methods of Econometrics. Rand McNally, Chicago, 1966.
5.Ruggles,Richard and Nancy, "Differential Fertility in United States Census Data,"
Demographic and Economic Change in Developed Countries. Princeton University
Press for National Bureau of Economic Research, 1960.
6. Willis, Robert J., "A New Approach to the Economic Theory of Fertility Behavior,"
mimeo, 1969; also "The Economic Determinants of Fertility Behavior," unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1971.
42AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH: THE MEASUREMENT
OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE—F. Thomas Juster
INTRODUCTION
Bothpractical men of affairs and economists would agree that income is derived
from wealth, and that income is equal to the flow of current services from wealth
plus or minus changes in the stock of wealth itself. Accounting systems for mea-
suring performance reflect these relationships to different degrees, however. In
one sense, the practical men of affairs do better: corporate assets generate gross
income, and subtracting depreciation on assets provides a measure of profit that,
while not very accurate, at least broadly reflects the return on assets. But the
national income, whether measured gross or net, is clearly not designed to repre-
sent the return on the national wealth—at least, not on the\ national wealth as
ordinarily measured. The basic reason is not difficult to see. Some two-thirds of
the national income represents a payment for labor services, and the asset from
which these services are obtained is not part of the national wealth as customarily
defined.
TheConcept of Performance
Forpurposes of this paper, social and economic performance is deemed to be
synonymous with net social and economic output—the flow of goods and services
that contribute to material welfare. This concept obviously goes well beyond
the notion of output produced and sold in the market at a price, since a great many
nonmarket activities that produce net output and thus economic welfare have
market counterparts from which guidance may be obtained on valuation. It makes
no more sense to permit the allocation of activities between the market and non-
market sectors to influence the total of material well-being than it seemed to
Kuznets many years ago to exclude residential housing from the concept of
national income simply because housing services were not generally sold by
business firms to consumers.
On the other hand, even a broad measure of social and economic output is not
synonymous with a psychological measure of human welfare. The measurement
of social and economic performance will inevitably be based on evaluation derived
from activity in the market, and hence will necessarily assume that goods and
services acquired or foregone are worth their market price or the equivalent.
AFramework for Measuring Performance
Ingeneral terms, economic and social output can be thought of as a flow of satis-
factions or utilities generated by combining the services of various types of capital
assets. A wide variety of such assets exist in the system, and they produce a num-
ber of different kinds of utilities. The assets themselves can be classified into five
broad categories: tangible capital assets (equipment and structures); intangible
capital assets (knowledge); human capital assets (acquired skills and basic abili-
ties); physical environmental assets; sociopolitical environmental assets.
Tangible capital assets comprise business assets, consumer assets divided into
housing and durables, and government assets.1 Intangible assets result from the
application of human capital and other resources to research and development
problems. This process results in the production of socially useful knowledge, a
type of asset that is analytically distinct from the skills and talents of the people
NOTE: This paper draws heavily on my essay in the 1970 Annual Report of the National
Bureau, "On the Measurement of Social and Economic Performance." The emphasis
here is somewhat different, being on research priorities, but the conceptual framework is
taken directly from the other paper as is the section on Environmental Assets and Returns.
In the present U.S. Income and Product Accounts, only tangible business assets and housing
are treated as capital assets.
43who produced that knowledge. It includes, but is not limited to, patented products
and processes. Human capital assets represent both innate ability and training,
the latter ranging all the way from parental time spent with children through
formal schooling and on to work experience designed to aid future productivity.
Physical environmental assets can be thought of as comprising both natural
resources as traditionally viewed, such as mineral and agricultural wealth, other
natural assets like temperature, precipitation, water and air, and partly man-made
assets like dams, forest preserves, and parks. The assets comprising the physical
environment and the sociopolitical environment overlap to some degree. While
welfare-producing assets like the amount and distribution of water resources and
the quality of the atmosphere clearly belong in the physical environment category,
environmental factors like population density are partly physical and partly social.
The major assets in the sociopolitical category are difficult to define precisely, but
are meant to cover concepts like equity, security, freedom, social and economic
mobility, privacy, and so forth.
Net economic and social output can be defined as the sum of direct consump-
tion benefits yielded by this collection of assets pius or minus net changes in the
assets themselves. The major differences between the present income and product
accounts and the ones implied by the concepts just outlined are: First, a much
wider range of outputs would be recognized as contributing to economic and
social welfare, including some that are free for some countries or regions while
only obtainable through the use of scarce resources for others. Second, changes in
stocks for a much wider range of assets would be explicitly taken into account,
with a resulting tendency to increase or reduce measured net output depending
on whether assets were being augmented or reduced as a consequence of activity
in the system. For example, deterioration of the physical or sociopolitical environ-
ment because of various types of externalities—air, water, noise and waste pollu-
tion, congestion, rising crime rates—means that the flow of benefits from these
assets has been reduced. Thus, where the process of economic growth deteriorates
the environment, an augmented set of accounts would register the usual increases
in net output resulting from growth in the market sector, but they would also
record an offset consisting of the degree to which environmental assets had been
depreciated with a consequent reduction in the flow of future benefits.
RESEARCHPRIORITIES
Empiricalimplementation of this general framework for measuring social and
economic performance is the main subject of the paper. The areas that seem most
amenable to quantitative investigation and of most importance for the illumina-
tion of policy choices are: (1) measurement of the returns from human capital,
especially the nonmarket returns; (2) measurement of the by-product effects of
economic activity on the yield from environmental assets; (3) measurement of
output for economic activities that are typically valued at production costs and
sold collectively, e.g., services like public education, police protection, etc.; (4) pro-
vision of a more analytically useful distinction between output that yields imme-
diate consumption benefits and output that yields future benefits; (5) measurement
of the way in which comprehensively defined social and economic output is dis-
tributed among the population.
HumanCapital Returns
Economicaccounting systems have fallen well behind the development of eco-
nomic concepts of human capital and its deployment in activities that produce real
income. Our accounts recognize that human capital produces an output equal to
its rental price when it is purchased in the market. Even here, it is implicitly
assumed that output consists only of the labor contribution to the firms' current
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altered either by the learning, aging, or obsolescence involved in its use.2
However, formal job market activities are only a fraction of the total income-
producing activities that use inputs of human capital. Going to school is not con-
ceptually different from going to work; raising children at home is not conceptually
different from teaching nursery school; serving on an unpaid public board of
directors is not conceptually different from serving on a private board for com-
pensation; keeping house for one's family is not conceptually different from keep-
ing house for other people's families; and rejecting an opportunity to work over-
time or to moonlight in order to enjoy more leisure time sounds as if it should
increase real income rather than reduce it.
Measuring the contribution of nonmarket activities to social and economic out-
put is a problem that has become of considerable interest to social accountants.
In one sense, the measurement problem is trivial: If one is willing to assume that
all human activities are adjusted so as to yield equalized returns at the margin, all
nonmarket activities can be valued at market wage rates and the gross output of
human capital is simply the hourly wage rate times 24.
Thereis much to be said for this view, both theoretically and empirically. Indi-
viduals can generally allocate their time between market and nonmarket activities
as they see fit, and families can do so with even greater ease than individuals be-
cause they have more degrees of freedom. Families can and do choose to substitute
purchased services (housekeeping, child care, home maintenance, etc.) for inputs
of their own time, and the higher the value of time as measured by market wage
rates the more likely the substitution. Similarly, families can and do substitute
market earnings for leisure or nonmarket activities, either by varying hours of
work via overtime and multiple-job holdings or by moving into or out of the labor
force as the demands on time spent in the household vary over the life cycle.
A good first approximation, therefore, is that time is allocated at the margin so
as to equalize its value in all activities, given the market wage rate. It is possible
that efforts at quantification can make little further headway than this. There are,
however, some areas that appear to be promising candidates for additional
research.
First, imputation of the marginal wage rate to all activities, while conceptually
able to resolve the measurement of gross output, cannot provide an estimate of
net output; the latter is clearly the more useful measure. Some amount of time
must be allocated to activities that do no more than maintain the stock of human
capital intact. Eating, sleeping, and perhaps leisure activities fall into this cate-
gory. In principle, any allocation of time essential to the maintenance of market
productivity should be considered as an intermediate rather than final product.
A thorny and perhaps insoluble question of purpose and motivation seems to
be involved. If the President needs to play golf in order to continue presidenting
at the same level of efficiency, then golf-time is not a final consumption good but
simply a capital maintenance activity. If, however, presidential golf-time is really
thought of (by the President) as final consumption, is it worth more than my
golf-time simply because the President's market wage rate is higher than mine?
Tentatively, I am inclined to argue that "pure" leisure is not worth more to one
person than another unless there are differences in the efficiency with which
"leisure" is pursued,8 but that other nonmarket activities of a more purposeful
The effects of learning (on-the-job training, to use Mincer's terminology) are heavily con-
centra ted in the early years of labor force participation and appear to be of greater importance
for those with more formal schooling. The effects of obsolescence are more heavily concentrated
in the later years. Thus the aggregate net effect depends on the age (and schooling) distribution
of the population, on the rate of technical change and on longevity.
For example, a high-wage person would presumably get more benefits than a low-wage one
from a given amount of chronological time devoted to playing golf: his golf equipment would be
more efficient, he might use a time-saving golf cart or an energy-saving caddy, he might belong
to a private club that enables him to play exactly when he wished, etc.
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be of differential value depending on who is engaged in the activity.
A second question concerns the allocation of nonmarket time between present
and future benefit flows. The general principle seems clear enough. If one spends
his evenings at home studying for a CPA examination, the time input represents
an investment in future income. If time is spent teaching one's children how to
recognize letters or how to resolve social conflicts with peers, the time input repre-
sents an investment in the child's future real income.
A third question concerns the efficiency of time use. Economists have tradi-
tionally viewed time as the ultimate allocative constraint: labor or capital can
always be increased or augmented by training or technical change, and natural
resources can always be discovered or manufactured in the laboratory. But all
these things must be accomplished within the constraint of a twenty-four hour
day. As a physical fact, the time constraint is tautologically valid. As an input into
the usual household or firm production functions, the time constraint can be
stretched: One can, and many do, commute to work or to a professional meeting
in Detroit and at the same time enjoy the leisure-time activity of listening to the
radio or the productive activity of finishing up a professional paper. One can com-
bine eating dinner with the consumption activity of conversing with adults or the
investment activity of training one's children. With a long enough extension cord,
an efficient housewife can spend an hour setting up the next night's PTA meeting
also wash the dishes, prepare dinner, and write a few Christmas cards. In
short, the right time units are efficiency hours and not calendar units; there are a
great many people who manage to get thirty hours worth of activities out of a
"standard" twenty-four hour day, and others who manage to get only twelve.
The last question is tangentially related to the third. Traditional theory argued
that the labor-supply function had an upward slope because a higher real wage
was needed to overcome the increased disutility from additional work. More
modern theory has discarded the idea of disutility and put in its place the mar-
ginal rate of substitution between work and leisure—along with the proposition
that leisure is, probably, a superior good. If by work one means turning screws on
the assembly line, washing dishes in a restaurant, or picking lettuce in the San
Fernando Valley, work probably does have net disutility, although conditions of
work have probably lessened that disutility over time.4 Moreover, occupations
of this type have surely been declining as a proportion of total labor force activity.
Market wage rates are, of course, associated with any net disutility or utility
(let us say consumption benefits) associated with work; other things equal, the
higher the consumption benefits, the lower the market wage. We have no (pres-
ently) observable measure of these benefits, however, since the "other things" are
plainly not equal between occupations. Not only are disagreeable and uninterest-
ing jobs apt to require little training and minimal levels of ability, but the consump-
tion benefits associated with any given occupation presumably vary among people.
Hence free occupational choice will tend to maximize the consumption benefits
associated with work in any given occupation. One suspects, nonetheless, that
there are marked differentials in consumption benefits among occupations, that
the amount of benefit is positively rather than negatively associated with the level
of market wage rates, and that the aggregate amount of consumption benefit
involved in market work has been increasing over time. It may well be the case
that the community as a whole now derives net benefits from work, whereas
formerly net negative benefits were the dominant characteristic of labor market
activity.
'Restaurants can be air conditioned and supplied with mechanical dishwashers, steel mills
use vastly more mechanization and have more work relief crews, etc. Many of these changes are
measurable, at least in terms of their cost to employers.
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Oneof the oldest questions posed by social accountants is the proper treatment
of activities, mainly but not entirely governmental, designed primarily to prevent
a reduction in social or economic welfare, e.g., the use of resources for national
defense purposes. During the Second World War the United States devoted close
to half of its total resources to military purposes: Was this net output or simply a
cost of maintaining the sociopolitical environment—a "regrettable necessity," to
use the prevailing terminology.
In principle, it is hard to see why the costs of maintaining any "given" environ-
ment, whether it be sociopolitical or physical, should be viewed as a part of net
output. A country that spends part of its resources to maintain a military estab-
lishment for defense against actual or potential enemies is less well off than one
that uses less of its resources in this way, other things equal. And a shift in the
political stability of the world community that results in the need, real or imagined,
for an expansion of military expenditures from 10 to 20 per cent of total output
has clearly resulted in a loss of social and economic well-being for the entire
community.
It is not, of course, only military outlays that fit this category. A community
that needs to spend more resources on policemen, firemen, burglar alarms, safety
locks, night watchmen, etc. is clearly worse off than one in which these outlays are
not necessary. No one buys police or fire protection, or hires night watchmen,
because these services are desired per Se. If there were no crime or fires, and no
risk of either, there would be no expenditure on crime or fire prevention and every-
one would be better off.
And the relevant class of activities extends far beyond the national or personal
security outlays discussed here. For example, resources used for medical care are
largely in the same category. Few people go to hospitals because they enjoy the
rest and the good food!
The analytically appropriate treatment is to view the sociopolitical environ-
ment as an asset that may yield direct consumption benefits in and of itself, and
that permits productive activities to be carried on without interference. Like any
asset, the sociopolitical environment can deteriorate or depreciate. Expenditures
required to "maintain the asset intact" constitute gross but not net output of the
system. Thus wars, crimes, and fires are specific manifestations (costs) of environ-
mental deterioration, while resources spent to suppress these manifestations must
be presumed to have enabled environmental assets to be better maintained than
in their absence. Further, depreciation of the sociopolitical environment can be
estimated as the sum of two components: first, costs imposed by the amount of
deterioration that has been permitted to occur, as represented by losses resulting
from crimes, fires, wars, etc.; second, costs incurred to maintain the asset at its
given level, as represented by expenditures on policemen, firemen, members of
the Armed Forces, etc. In the absence of these maintenance expenditures, or in the
event of their reduction, it must be presumed that the asset would deteriorate
further and that the costs represented by specific manifestations of deterioration
would thus increase. Optimum social policy, of course, consists of equating at the
margin the cost functions associated with these two activities.
The appropriate treatment of the much-discussed subject of pollution of the
physical environment should now be evident. A community starts off with a stock
of such assets—air and water of a certain degree of purity, roads that are free of
abandoned cars, playgrounds and streets free from discarded newspapers, broken
bottles, etc. As a, perhaps inevitable, part of the process of industrialization and
economic growth, these environmental assets tend to deteriorate or depreciate,
thus reducing the flow of benefits from enviromental assets. Expenditures de-
signed to slow down or reduce deterioration are clearly costs associated with the
maintenance of the asset rather than an output of the system. As with the socio-
political environment discussed earlier, the full cost of deterioration is the sum
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deterioration. Alternatively, one could view industrialization and economic growth
as producing a series of dis-products and dis-services—various kinds of impurities
and undesired products introduced into the physical environment and left there.
In the absence of expenditures designed to reduce environmental deterioration,
real net output is decreased by the negative value of these dis-products and dig-
services.
There is an interesting difference between types of environmental deterioration
cases that superficially appear to be similar. Compare the situation in which real
or imagined needs for defense cause a country to use x per cent of its resources
for military purposes with one in which deterioration of the physical environment
causes the country to use the same fraction of resources to control pollution. In the
latter case, there is a strong presumption that deterioration of the environment
is a direct consequence of the normal functioning and growth of the economy. If
so, the flow of benefits from economic growth is clearly overstated unless allow-
ance is made for the negative byproducts of growth.
In the former case, however, it is far from clear that the environmental mainte-
nance costs represented by the need for a large defense establishment is a result
of the normal functioning and growth of the system. One could conceive of cir-
cumstances in which that might be the case; e.g., an aggressor nation building up
its military strength in order to overcome other countries and thence derive future
economic benefits. But in general the causality is unclear.
If defense outlays are basically unrelated to the functioning of the socio-
economic system and simply reflect exogenous events, should one "penalize" the
system by treating such outlays as environmental maintenance costs? If the
objective is to measure changes in social and economic welfare, it seems that the
answer should be yes. Resources used for defense cannot be used elsewhere—and
I cannot see that it matters for purposes of measuring whether defense welfare
needs are a cause of one's own actions, are real but exogenous to one's actions,
or are wholly imaginary. It does, however, make a great deal of difference for the
analysis of policy alternatives whether or not the system has created its own
defense needs. If this is the case, there is a hidden cost to a change in policy that
increases the optimum size of the defense establishment, just as there is a hidden
cost to a growth policy that produces deterioration in the physical environment
as an inevitable byproduct.
If defense needs are unrelated to economic and social policy, however, the
appropriate analogy is to phenomena like earthquakes, floods, and other natural
disasters: welfare is willy-nilly reduced, and there is nothing that can be done
about it. But the reduction is real and needs to be registered in the accounts.
PublicSector Performance
Aswith regrettable necessities, social accountants have long been concerned about
the problems associated with the measurement of output in the public sector. Our
social accounting conventions essentially say that public services are worth their
cost. The rapid growth of resources devoted to services generally, and especially
to those services for which no output measure is available, has created a renewed
interest in these problems. It is not much of an exaggeration to say that, unless we
can devise meaningful measures of output or performance in the public service
sectors of the economy, and unless we can devise incentives to improve produc-
tivity as reflected by those performance measures, the United States may be faced
with an increasingly serious drag on the rate of over-all economic growth and of
social and economic welfare.
The output measurement problems in the public sector can be illustrated by the
education industry. The provision of educational services is largely a public sector
activity, but by no means exclusively so. Hence there is a market test for output,
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biles. People can choose to send their children to private profit-making schools,
to private not-for-profit schools, or to public institutions. However, neither public
nor private institutions can really specify what parents are buying when they
send their children to school, and the "managers" of the "industry" would be
hard put to say what it is that they are producing, whether they are producing it as
efficiently as possible, or the technical characteristics of their production func-
tions. In contrast, the producers of wheat, steel, and automobiles certainly know
which production techniques are efficient and which are not, and by how much
output will change if more of one input is used and less of another. Further, what
they are producing is a product with specified characteristics, and consumers are
free to accept or reject the product depending on the value placed on these char-
acteristics. Hence the problem is only partly a public sector problem and is more
appropriately described as a subclass of quality change problems.
In principle, what one would like to measure is reasonably clear: schools take
youngsters with a given amount of innate ability, a given family background,
given motivation, etc. and expose them to several years worth of instruction in the
development of basic skills, the acquisition of factual knowledge, the techniques
of problem solving, and so forth. The output of the school system is presumably
the total gain in achievement accomplished by all students. Even if we could not
translate gains in schooling achievement into their ultimate output—their influence
on adult behavior and performance—it would still be of considerable value for
improving efficiency in the education industry if we could simply measure the
gains in achievement attributable to schooling per se and not to other inputs.
The type of problem encountered in measuring output in the education industry
is found in virtually all of the public service sectors and in many private sectors
as well. For example, we do not measure the output of the health industry by what
is achieved in reducing work-loss time via a lesser incidence of disabling illness,
nor by its effect in increasing expected lifetime; we do not measure the value of
police or fire protection by the number of crimes prevented or the value of lives
and property saved; and so on. For many if not most of these activities, we know
in principle what the proper output measure is, although in many cases the out-
put is multifaceted and not easy to quantify. But it is much easier to measure the
costs of providing these services than to measure the results of providing them,
and we are generally driven to settle for the former. One of the high priority
items on the research agenda for social and economic measurement during the
next decade will be to start providing true output measures for all of the areas in
which we now rest more or less content with input measures.
PresentVersus Future Output
Ourpresent accounts divide total output into consumption and investment com-
ponents that clearly fail to coincide with an analytically useful separation of the
two. Social accountants have been working on this problem for several years now,
and recent studies by Kendrick and the Ruggles5 have provided quantitative esti-
mates for a much more comprehensive measure of investment.
One area that has not yet been examined for its investment-consumption impli-
cation was touched on earlier—the division of nonmarket activities between those
geared to the provision of present benefits and those geared to the future. Some
of the important questions here concern investments in learning or training in the
labor market, which can be either positive or negative, and parental investments
in preschool and school-age children. All these are essentially problems of esti-
See Richard and Nancy Ruggles, The Design of Economic Accounts, New York, NBER, 1970.
Kendrick'swork is still in manuscript form.
49mating investments in human capital, which take place both in and out of the
labor market and both during and before formal schooling.
TheDistribution of Economic Welfare
Allof the problems discussed above have been concerned with the measurement
of aggregate social and economic welfare. On any research agenda this is the most
useful place to start, for several reasons. First, unless one can measure the aggre-
gate one probably cannot measure anything at all. Second, policy priorities should
probably be geared to the size of the aggregate gains or losses involved: to spell
out the obvious, if deterioration of the physical environment results in a welfare
loss of $5billionper year, it is hard to justify spending $10 billion per year to
prevent that ioss.
While the aggregate measure thus has the higher priority, the distributional
questions are important and warrant serious consideration. This is especially so
in view of the fact that the existing evidence on income distribution is based
almost entirely on income as measured by the National Income and Product
Accounts. An augmented measure of income would differ drastically from the
present one, and there is no presumption that the distribution of broadly defined
economic welfare looks anything like the distribution of narrowly defined money
income, nor that changes over time in the distribution of welfare are similar to
changes over time in the distribution of money income.
A case can be made for the proposition that many of the flows that would enter
a broadly defined measure of welfare, but are excluded from our present narrowly
defined measure of money income, tend to be distributed less equally than money
income, hence that economic welfare may be less evenly distributed than money
income. And it is distinctly possible that the inequality in welfare may have been
increasing over time. Some of the major differences between a broad economic
welfare measure and a money income measure are discussed below, with com-
ments about their possible distributional characteristics.
1. Although it has not been discussed above, a major exclusion from money
income as measured in the Income and Product Accounts is the flow of capital
gains. These certainly warrant inclusion in a measure of the way in which income
is distributed over any reasonably long time period: capital gains are obviously
distributed very unequally, presumably more like the wealth distribution than the
income distribution.6
2. The distribution of nonmarket output, as reflected by the allocation of non-
market time, might have relatively little impact on income inequality. First, hours
of labor force time tend to be positively correlated with total earnings, hence
people with higher earnings will tend to have less available nonmarket time. But
second, differences in the efficiency of time use among the population are likely
to be positively correlated with differences in the level of education and earnings:
thus differences in the distribution of time measured in efficiency units are prob-
ably an offset, and perhaps a more than complete offset, to differences in the
distribution of physical time.
3. The incidence of environmental costs and benefits is not obvious. For the
sociopolitical environment, the costs of resources used to maintain the asset are
distributed in accordance with the burden of taxation; the benefits could plausibly
be distributed either in terms of wealth or in terms of income. If the benefits are
distributed by wealth, income inequality is increased by the burden of maintaining
these assets, while if the benefits are distributed by income there is probably not
much impact.
For the physical environment, where we have so far chosen to absorb the losses
Some empirical work on this subject is contained in an unpublished Ph.D. dissertation by
Michael McElroy.
50rather than pay the maintenance costs, the burden is probably larger on low-
income urban families, and hence the welfare distribution is pushed towards less
equality.
4. The inclusion in welfare of any net consumption benefits from work would
probably tend to increase inequality, since there is almost certainly a strong posi-
tive correlation between money income and net consumption benefits from work.
In fact, the consumption benefits are likely to be positive for high-income families
and negative for low-income families.
Adding up all of these effects with some kind of rough implicit weights suggests
that social and economic welfare is less equally distributed than money income,
and possibly a great deal less so. Moreover, most of the trends over time in the
importance of presently unmeasured aspects of welfare suggests that inequality
may have been growing rather than decreasing. But these are very rough and
largely intuitive guesses about magnitudes and probable incidence, and do no
more than suggest a possibility that the rising incidence of social and economic
discontent might be in part due to an increasingly less equal distribution of the
output produced by the social and economic system.
RESEARCHSTRATEGIES
Nonmarket Activities
Theone indispensable ingredient for estimates of the level and distribution of
nonmarket outputs seems self-evident: we need a carefully designed and large-
scale study of time allocation among American families. A number of such studies
have been conducted over the past years, although none seem to have the level
of analytical detail required to fill in the kinds of estimates discussed above. We
probably know enough at this point to be able to design such a study, although
whether it can actually be carried out successfully and whether it can be financed
are both open questions. As to the former, the level of required detail seems to
suggest that we need some means of observing what people do virtually every
minute of the day. The usual procedure is for interviewers to ask respondents
what they were doing today or yesterday or last week, but that seems insufficient
for the kind of activity-specific detail required by the analytical uses to be served.
Having interviewers follow people around with a little notebook is certainly
feasible, but it raises a serious question as to whether activities have been changed
by the fact of their being observed—a problem that is unique to investigation in the
social sciences. Ideally, something like closed-circuit television (without the unit
being aware of the observation), seems like the kind of measurement technique
needed. I do not make that suggestion seriously, but simply use it to illustrate the
kind of observational environment that might be needed.
EnvironmentalAsset Yields
Thereare two general ways in which one might estimate the welfare loss from
environmental deterioration. One is to observe the specific physical consequences
of environmental change, then translate these physical consequences into meas-
ures of social and economic cost. The appropriate cost measure is presumably the
difference between the benefits yielded by activities that were carried out before
the environmental change and the benefits yielded by the altered pattern of
activities that result from the change. Measurement of the physical consequences
(tons of soot per week) is relatively straightforward, at least compared with the
measurement of the social and economic costs. Substitution of alternative activi-
ties and tradeoffs of one resource use against another is the rule rather than the
exception in economic behavior, and we need to measure the net influence of all
the adjustments that will be made to a change in environmental conditions.
For example, one solution to a heavy concentration of air pollutants in urban
51areas would be the imposition of sufficiently heavy taxes on the use of offending
facilities to encourage investment in pollution control equipment. The optimal tax
would be one that balances, at the margin, benefits (the reduced welfare loss
associated with lower contamination levels) against costs (the investment in
equipment). But neither the welfare loss from contamination nor the cost of
lowering contamination levels is likely to be a simple linear function of con-
tamination level.
Moreover, investment in pollution control equipment is only one of a number
of ways in which welfare losses can be reduced. An alternative might be invest-
ment in transportation designed to facilitate a greater spatial separation of work-
ing and living areas and to encourage greater specialization of working versus
living areas. This program would also reduce the welfare loss: the costs associated
with any given volume of urban pollutants would be lowered because fewer con-
sumption activities would be located in urban areas. In short, the creation of
geographic areas with specialized uses might permit the simultaneous existence
of high contamination levels in specified areas and relatively little welfare loss.
An interesting alternative strategy is to assume that the market has already
done the measurements for us, via the generation of compensating income dif-
ferentials. If the incidence of environmental deterioration is uneven across geo-
graphic units, if labor markets allocate resources in such a way as to equalize real
wages at the margin, and if the optimum technology is a function of density,
areas with a greater amount of environmental disamenities (to use the phrase
employed by Tobin and Nordhaus in a recent paper which used this technique)7
would have to offer a higher equilibrium wage to given quality labor. Given these
assumptions, the real wage differential becomes a measure of the welfare loss
associated with environmental deterioration. More precisely, it becomes a measure
of the loss from structural shifts in location towards areas with greater amounts of
environmental disamenities, but it cannot provide an estimate of the absolute
(base) level of disamenity.
While there are serious problems with this approach, primarily in specifying
the estimating equation, it seemed promising enough to warrant further work.
One of its chief advantages is that it provides a global estimate of the net influence
of all kinds of environmental deterioration, and thus provides a "ball park" esti-
mate of the total social loss involved.
IncomeDistribution
Estimatesof the distributional incidence of economic welfare must be based on
microdata. Since an enormous amount of information will ultimately be required,
and since the cost of new data is so high, one obvious solution is to tap existing
data sets and attempt to synthesize information obtained from different house-
holds. For purposes of measuring social and economic welfare, the use of syn-
thetically created households designed to represent different household types in
the population does not present any problem, and additional microdata can easily
be added to existing information provided the relevant household characteristics
are known. Thus one research focus is to create a set of synthetic households with
specified characteristics, for whom virtually all of the desired real income variables
are known or can be obtained. There is no particular reason why this cannot be
done, although it may turn out that a good many of the variables needed to measure
welfare are not contained in any existing microdata set and therefore have to be
obtained from new samples. There is also, of course, a major problem of con-
cocting variables with which one can measure the various aspects of welfare
deemed to be important.
William Nordhaus and James Tobin, "Is Growth Obsolete?" paper prepared for Colloquium
on Economic Growth, NBER Fiftieth Anniversary, December 10,1970.
52NEW PLANS AND RESULTS OF RESEARCH
IN ECONOMIC FORECASTING—Victor Zarnowitz
ON MEASURING THE CONTRIBUTION AND PERFORMANCE OF FORECASTING METHODS
Three Approaches to the Evaluation of Forecasting Procedures
Recentresearch in economic forecasting has achieved significant success in de-
veloping criteria of predictive accuracy and applying them to new collections of
diverse and interesting data.' It also demonstrated that useful information about
the implicit structure of forecasts for which no explicit models are available can
be distilled from comparisons of such forecasts with benchmark predictions
derived by a known, replicable method [14] [13].Furtherstudies in this area
should focus on the question of how predictive accuracy is related to the method
and structure of forecasts.
Most economic forecasts are made to facilitate and improve business or eco-
nomic policy decisions. in principle, then, the success of such forecasts should be
measured by the degree to which they reduce errors in these decisions, allowing
for any tradeoffs between the effects of the different errors and between the gains
from better prediction and the time and dollar costs of forecast improvement. Full
application of this criterion, however, poses high informational requirements,
namely:
1. That the forecasts be all verifiable and their errors actually ascertained.
2. That the preferences of the decision maker and the constraints under
which he operates be so specified as to permit evaluation of the conse-
quences of forecasting errors in the context of the relevant "loss function."
3. That the effective costs of producing the forecasts be known or adequately
estimated.
Typically, information on (1) and (2) is not available to an outside analyst. The
costs of developing good quantitative data of this sort should vary with the com-
plexity of the underlying problems, but they are probably often so large, even
to the decision makers and forecasters who are directly involved, that the informa-
tion may well be altogether incomplete. Studies of economic forecasting, there-
fore, must seek to advance as well as possible with little direct knowledge of costs
and returns on types of forecasting activity.2 It seems natural to view the accuracy
of forecasts as being the single most important measurable aspect of their quality,
even though it is recognized that knowledge of the size of forecasting errors may
not be adequate to determine the consequences of forecasting errors for decisions
based on the forecasts.
Forecasts of economic conditions that are actually proffered for business and
public policy uses are generally the products of judgmental combinations of vari-
ous techniques. This is so partly because forecasters face different problems which
are believed to require different approaches; partly because they distrust relying
on any single method; and partly because they wish to take account of information
Nom: I am indebted to Robert C. Coates, James C. Ellert, and Mrs. Josephine Su for
efficient help with the statistical work.
Comprehensive work in this area was done at the National Bureau of Economic Research [19]
[16)[6) [12] [3][5] [23][24]. Major contributions made elsewhere include those by Theil at
the Econometric Institute of the Netherlands School of Economics, as well as by Christ, Klein,
Okun, Suits, Stekier, and others. Space is not adequate here to give even a very incomplete
listing of these works. For a fairly large but still far from exhaustive bibliography, see (20,
pp. 437-439].
a Theeconomic concept of a rate-of-return criterion of forecast appraisal remains important,
however. It implies first the insistence on point (1) in the text above, which provides the principle
for the selection of forecasts to be analyzed. Second, it suggests that the choice of the measure of
average forecast accuracy be linked to the assumed form of the loss function (e.g., if a quadratic
loss criterion is adopted, the appropriate measure is the root mean square error; see [18]).Fora
discussion and application of several alternative error-cost functions, see [15,Chap.IX].
53that does not fit into any preconceived model (e.g., the latest news about such
exogenous or "random" events as strikes, wars, elections, etc., or "autonomous"
expectations concerning developments of this kind). Thus, predictions of the
economy's future course are seldom derived by methods that are fully specified,
explicit, and reproducible. How, then, can one go about trying to answer the
high-priority question about the relative efficiency of forecasting procedures?
The problem can be attacked in different ways, mainly directly or mainly in-
directly, depending on the type of forecasts involved and the amount of informa-
tion about them. I can perceive three workable approaches which are comple-
mentary rather than substitutive: (1)analysisof ex ante and ex post forecasts
with econometric models; (2) comparison of authentic forecasts, which do not
have a fully specified structure, with constructed benchmark forecasts, which do;
and (3) study of surveys which include information about the procedures that
the respondents use in deriving their reported predictions. The three sections that
follow discuss these approaches briefly in the above order.
Sourcesof Errors in Econometric Model Forecasts
Aneconometric model is not, as a rule, sufficient for making predictions: The
values of the exogenous variables derive equally from information from outside
the model and from the forecaster's judgment. Typically, the interaction between
the forecaster and the model is much more extensive and complex than that, how-
ever, since various judgmental adjustments of the constant terms (and possibly
other parameter estimates) of the model are frequently carried out in the process
of deriving the predictions. Rough estimates of the joint effects on the predictions
of both such adjustments and the errors in the exogenous inputs can be obtained
by comparing the accuracy of the reported ex ante forecasts and of the ex post
forecasts which the model would have produced in the absence of any modifica-
tions of its stated structure and given the correct historical values of the exogenous
variables. If full information were available on the adjustments that were actually
made, considerably more could be done to decompose the over-all error of the
ex ante forecasts into the parts attributable to (1) the model itself, i.e., its basic
specifications and method of estimation; (2) the forecaster's own predictions of
the exogenous variables; (3) his decisions to alter the constants in the model or
to assign values other than zero, the expected value, to some disturbance terms;
(4)anyother sources of error including deficiencies in the data used; and (5) the
interaction among these different types of error. To be sure, even with all the in-
formation about the model, data, and procedures that could conceivably be as-
sembled, the present-day evaluation techniques would still not provide a complete
anatomy of the errors of forecasts with econometric models.3 But the potential
gains from such assessments are probably large, and much remains to be done
along these lines both to compile and to explore the record of econometric fore-
casting.
Of the several reasons for this, the difficulty of testing the specification of the model appears
to be particularly serious. Economic theory helps mainly qualitatively, by indicating what vari-
ables to choose and what signs of coefficients to expect, but it typically gives little information
about the size of the parameters, the precise form of the relationships (nonlinearities), the lag
structure, etc. This leaves much room for sample experimentation, which, however, may improve
the fit of the model to the historical data rather than its predictive ability. Proper tests of the
forecasting performance are therefore essential, but here again serious problems arise. If devia-
tions from the structural continuity of the economy are substantial, a model may describe the
historical experience well and yet err considerably in prediction. It is then difficult to distinguish
between tests of predictive performance and tests of structural stability. There is the further
complication that the exact distribution properties of estimators for small samples are not estab-
lished—and the samples of observations from economic time series used in the econometric
models are usually rather small. Also, the argument is made that the tests should be designed
"in a true ex ante framework" (allowing fully for the interaction between the model and the
model-builder acting as forecaster), but it is not clear how, precisely, this should be done.
See [4] and [10].
54Benchmark Models of Basic Forecasting Methods
Theforecasting devices that are currently most relevant can be classified broadly
as (1)extrapolativetechniques; (2) surveys of intentions or anticipations by
economic decision-making units; (3) business cycle indicators; and (4) econo-
metric models. Each of the four methods provides materials that are widely used
as ingredients in forecasting the course of the economy, although the ways of
combining such diverse data vary greatly, as do the weights which are in effect
assigned to the underlying procedures. Each of the methods can also be employed
alone: consider projections of historical values of the series to be predicted, from
the simplest "naive" models to the technically sophisticated representations of
autoregressive and moving average processes; opinion polls or aggregations of the
expectations of individual businessmen or consumers; strictly mechanical uses
of indicators, say, in regressions of lagging or coincident indicator series on the
leading indicators; and similar applications of reduced forms of predictive econo-
metric models. Such pure or extreme forms are generally not presented as fore-
casts proper, but they often serve as benchmarks of predicting performance. For
example, authentic forecasts of, say, GNP are compared with outputs of various
extrapolative formulas applied to the past values of GNP; business expenditures
on plant and equipment, as predicted from a regression equation with past values
of selected explanatory variables, are compared with aggregated business anticipa-
tions of such outlays; judgmental forecasts of industrial production by a business
economist are compared with predictions based on a lagged regression of produc-
tion on new orders; and ex ante forecasts of any of these variables obtained by a
team of econometricians armed with a large-scale model of the economy are
compared with the corresponding ex post forecasts.4 However, at present such
comparisons tend to be used in limited and haphazard ways, chiefly as screening
devices. The research strategy here proposed is to confront bona fide forecasts
from various sources with a full array of these benchmark predictions so that
as much information as possible can be extracted from the analysis about the
relative accuracy, not only of the forecasts proper, but also, more importantly, of
the forecasting methods. Furthermore, in doing so we should be gaining some
knowledge of the structure of the forecasts proper which, as already noted, is for
the most part (in particular, for all the "judgmental" business forecasts) unknown
and not directly observable.
Surveysof Forecasts
Comprehensive,periodic surveys of economic forecasts offer another program
for the comparative analysis of forecasting procedures: The participants can be
asked to specify their methods, assumptions, etc.; their predictions can be grouped
according to the resulting replies; and the forecasts in the different groups can
then be studied and perhaps ranked by some criteria of relative performance.
Notable among the evident advantages of this direct approach are that the fore-
casters themselves tell us about the methods they use and that this original
information relates to the collected forecast data. It should certainly be possible
to obtain valuable qualitative information in this way, although the process
is time-consuming and may be relatively costly; but the real limitation here is that
surveys are not apt to furnish quantitative data on the relative importance of the
different forecasting techniques.5 Moreover, one would not expect this approach
'It will be noted that the last item listed in this sentence refers to approach (1),discussedin
the previous section. Approach (2),whichis the subject of the present section, can in this sense
be viewed as including elements of (1)asa special case.
Consultations with business economists and study of forecast data and the literature
(see, e.g., [2])allleave little doubt that many forecasters would find it quite difficult and costly—
perhaps altogether impractical—to quantify such information. Forecasters will, however, rank
the principal forecasting methods according to the relative importance of these methods in their
work. (Data of this sort are discussed in the next-to-last section of this paper.)
55to give conclusive results for any sample in which either the forecasters failed to
show significant differences in the choice of methods or the forecasts failed to vary
significantly in their average accuracy.
Some forecasting procedures are designed mainly to deal with particular types
of economic events or movements: thus, selected indicator series are used to pre-
dict business cycle turning points and, for certain variables, extrapolations of
past trends are used to project future trends. It is therefore possible that such
methods serve the forecasters much better at certain times than at others; e.g., an
indicator "benchmark model" might prove most useful at revivals and recessions,
while an extrapolative model might come out ahead in periods of continued
growth. Periodic surveys of forecasts that include information about the methods
used by each forecaster offer a way of testing this possibility. If the surveys were
taken frequently enough over a sufficiently long and varied stretch of time, sep-
arate comparisons- of forecasts based on different procedures could be made for
periods with different characteristics such as short and protracted expansions,
turning points, and recessions. This is clearly a potentially important application
of a "cross-sectional" analysis of forecast data, and should complement the time
series analysis, which is concerned with the over-all accuracy, bias, efficiency, and
consistency of forecasts.
FurtherSteps
Thepreceding sections give merely a broad outline of some research undertakings
which, I submit, are needed and promising but also rather ambitious. To elaborate
a little, we are interested in the relative strengths and weaknesses of specific
modelsand procedures. Evidently the models that are being used for macro-
economic forecasting, simulation, and analysis differ greatly in size, structure, and
statistical implementation, although some of them overlap others and some are
more interesting than others. Studies of the comparative performance of major
econometric models can promote understanding of the role of such differences and
improve ability to discriminate among alternative formulations of economic rela-
tionships. Similar observations about the need for specificity and diversity apply,
mutatis mutandis, to the work on other forecasting procedures (extrapolations,
anticipation surveys, indicators).
The suggested agenda for future work on economic forecasts and forecasting
procedures builds on past and current research at the National Bureau and else-
where. The new project is still in a very early stage, which as usual involves con-
siderable uncertainty and experimentation. Nevertheless, some of the results are
worth discussing now, and I shall draw on them in what follows to illustrate how
our research plans are being implemented.
ONTHE ACCURACY AND PROPERTIES OF FORECASTS WITH ECONOMETRIC MODELS
Ex Ante and Ex Post Forecast Errors
Anovel and informative analysis of the record of predictions made with the aid
of two econometric models, Wharton-EFU and OBE, is offered in [5].Thedata
used in Table 1-2 were obtained through the courtesy of Haitovsky and Treyz
from [9],anextended and updated version of the earlier work in [5].
Table1-2 shows selected measures relating to the accuracy of the Wharton and
OBE model forecasts for GNP, namely, ratios of mean absolute errors of cor-
responding ex post (XP) and ex ante (XA) predictions and XP alone. The fore-
casts cover spans of time that vary from one to four quarters; the measures are
listed separately for each span. The first two columns of the table are based on
the errors of the authentic ex ante forecasts which incorporate the model builders'
original judgmental adjustments (OR) of the constant terms; exactly the same
OR adjustments were also applied in the computation of the mean absolute errors
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Wharton and OBE Model Ex Post Forecasts of GNP over Spans of from
One to Four Quarters, Comparisons with Ex Ante Forecasts
With and Without Adjustments of Constant Terms
Measures Relating to GNP Forecasts
With Original With Mechanical
Span
Forecast
Judgmental Adjustments Adjustments Without Adjustments
(OR) (AR or GG) (NO)
XPb XA/XPC XPbXA/XPC XPb XA/XPC
(quarters) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WhartonModel, 1966 111-1969 III
One 5.97 0.63 11.02 0.87 27.32 1.05
Two 10.05 0.78 17.12 0.90 35.26 1.08
Three 11.65 0.89 20.79 0.99 26.34 1.15
Four 14.20 0.89 22.36 1.07 24.98 1.10
Next year 8.68 0.76 13.78 1.04 23.82 1.17
OBE Model, 1967 11-1969 III
One 4.35 0.49 4.58 1.03 6.44 0.97
Two 8.76 0.89 9.26 1.12 13.78 0.99
Three 13.65 0.93 15.61 1.04 18.75 0.94
Four 19.37 1.01 22.43 1.00 23.54 1.04
Next year 11.18 1.03 13.29 1.13 16.65 1.05
'AR adjustments use the simple average of the last two observed residuals, (es+ee_i)/2.
GG adjustments use p1'(es+pet_i)/2, where p is the estimated first-order autocorrelation
coefficient of the residual errors and T is the span of the forecast. See text and footnote 6.
bXP=meanabsolute error (MAE) of the ex post forecasts of gross national product (GNP),
in billions of current dollars.
XA/XP =ratioof MAE of the cx ante forecasts of GNF to the corresponding MAE of the
ex post forecast (XP).
of the ex post forecasts. Columns 3 and 4 relate to forecasts with two types of
mechanical adjustment, AR or GG, described in footnote a of the table.6 Which-
ever adjustment gives, on balance, lower errors in the given case is used, but
always the same adjustment is applied to the corresponding ex ante and ex post
predictions. Finally, in columns 5 and 6, the XP and XA measures are compared
for the forecasts made without any adjustments of the constant terms (NO).
Reading down the XP columns, one finds the usual tendency of the average
errors to increase with the length of the predictive span; the errors rise less than
in proportion to the length, however.7 The same applies to the corresponding
summary measures of error for ex ante forecasts (XA). Hence the ratios XA/XP
neither increase nor decrease systematically as the forecast span lengthens.
The original judgmental adjustments tend to result in lower average errors
than the mechanical adjustments, and the ex post forecasts with no adjustments of
the constant terms have by far the largest errors. That is, typically, XP —OR<
(XP —AR,XP —GG)<XP —NO,as can be seen by comparing columns 1, 3,
and 5. Again the same applies to the errors of the ex ante forecasts, as summarized
in the XA measures. Indeed, the adjustments, particularly the judgmental ones,
0TheAR. procedure is characteristic of the type of mechanical adjustment often used by the
Wharton forecasting team. This adjustment does not vary with the span of prediction. The GG
procedure was developed by George Green in adaptation of the form of adjustment proposed
in [7] and applied to the OBE model; see [8]. For the formulas used, see Table 1-2, footnote a.
In other words, errors cumulate over the successive quarterly periods within a span, but most
often (although not very regularly) by decreasing increments. This behavior has been found in a
variety of forecasts (see [19, Chap. 5]).Forecastsfor one year ahead (column 5) can be viewed as
referring to the average levels in the next four quarters and thus as having effective spans of
approximately 2½quarters.
57reduce the XA errors even more than the XP ones. (Note that the XA/XP ratios
in column 2 are, with rather few exceptions, smaller than their counterparts in
columns 4 and 6.) This underscores the success of the OR adjustments which, of
course, originate in the efforts of the econometric forecasters to improve their
ex ante predictions.
The errors of the ex ante forecasts are on the average smaller than those of
the cx post forecasts with the same judgmental adjustments: Most of the XA/XP
ratios in column 2 are less than 1. With mechanical adjustments or with no adjust-
ments at all, XA > XP in most cases, but the deviations of the ratios from unity
are here generally smaller (columns 4 and 6).
For most other variables, too, the XA/XP ratios are predominantly less than 1
(often by large margins) when the OR adjustments are applied. Measures for a
collection of eight important variables8 show that XA < XP in nearly half the
cases when the mechanical adjustments are used and in a smaller but still appreci-
able proportion of cases even when no adjustments at all are made. These general
findings apply to both the Wharton and the OBE models, but the tendencies for
the ex ante forecasts to be more accurate than the corresponding cx post forecasts,
and for the OR adjustments to reduce the errors, are on the whole weaker for the
OBE than for the Wharton model.9
AnInterpretation of the Findings
Theevidence on the Wharton and OBE forecasts, as presented in [5] and [9],
suggests the following observations.
1. Mechanical adjustments of a very simple type, involving only the last two
observed single-equation disturbances and sometimes the first-order autocorrela-
tion of these terms, tend to reduce the errors of the cx post forecasts. This effect
is especially strong for the Wharton predictions. It reflects the presence of sub-
stantial serial dependencies in the residuals, whether these are due to the omission
of important variables or of minor random factors that nevertheless have some
net lingering influence, to misspecification of the form of a relationship, or to
measurement errors in the variables to be "explained." There is evidence that the
gains from the mechanical adjustments are larger and more widespread for predic-
tions over the short spans—one or two quarters—than over the longer spans. It
appears that the autocorrelated errors here involved are mainly short-lived, par-
ticularly in the more volatile series, but that they are larger and more persistent
in some of the relatively smooth, trend-dominated variables.
2. On balance of the evidence, judgmental alterations of constant terms reduce
the XP errors still more than mechanical procedures, particularly for the shorter-
span predictions. Inspection of residuals for any pattern that may have poten-
tial predictive value has long been recognized as a useful practice in forecasting
with econometric models, so presumably the OR adjustments include much of the
information that is contained in the AR or GG adjustments. In addition, however,
the judgmental adjustments can incorporate information about exogenous devel-
opments already in progress or impending, such as a large strike, a major bank-
ruptcy or sectoral financial difficulties, a war, a foreign crisis. They can be used
to deal with autonomous elements in fiscal and monetary policies, e.g., changes
in tax rates or reserve requirements. They can allow for small revisions of inputs
of data and take advantage of the most recent information on the current state of
variables include GNP, personal consumption expenditures, gross private domestic
investment, change in nonfarm business inventories, GNP implicit price deflator, unemploy-
ment rate, corporate profits before taxes (Wharton only), and net exports (OBE only). All of
these are in billions of current dollars, except the price deflator (1958= 100.0) andthe unem-
ployment rate (percentage of the labor force).
One possible reason for this is that the ex ante forecasts made by the OBE are not released
to the public. Judgmental adjustments may play a smaller role in these forecasts and are in
any event difficult to reconstruct.
58the economy. Such adjustments may be made before the model is solved to obtain
the forecast or after the forecasters have examined the model predictions and
found any of them "unreasonable," given their prior concepts and external infor-
mation. Clearly, mechanical adjustments can still be viewed as a part of the model,
but the judgmental ones cannot. The success of the latter emphasizes the role
of the forecaster in his interaction with the econometric model.
3. In this analysis, the XA and XP measures are strictly matched. The only
source of difference between them is that the ex ante predictions are based on the
forecasters' estimates of the values of the exogenous inputs; the ex post predic-
tions, on historical data for these variables. Since the latter information is pre-
sumed correct, whereas the judgmental "guesstimates" of the exogenous values
inevitably contain errors, this factor per se must work in favor of the ex post
predictions. Yet the XA errors are frequently smaller than the corresponding XP
errors. Some of these differences are minor and probably not significant, but
some are substantial. Even where the ratios are close to unity, the question may be
raised why they are not higher. The low XA/XP ratios are observed in the first
place in connection with the judgmental (OR) adjustments, especially for the
Wharton model. It is possible that these adjustments are frequently of a kind
to offset the defective external predictions for the exogenous variables. Actually,
if no other factors were at work here, strict offsets would merely prevent XA from
exceeding XP, that is, they would equalize the two errors; the OR procedure
would have to do more than that to draw XA below the levels of XP.
4. Even where only mechanical adjustments are used, XA <XP in nearly half
of the comparisons made. Conceivably, such procedures would sometimes work
to cancel the errors in the predicted exogenous inputs into the model, but the
validity of this conjecture is untested and uncertain. In any event, this factor
could not fully account for the findings under discussion. Moreover, XA/XP
ratios that are smaller than 1 are observed even for predictions made without any
adjustments of the constant terms, especially for the OBE model (see, e.g.,
column 6 in Table 1-2). This suggests that the models contain some misspecifica-
tions which are being more than offset by errors in exogenous variables. This
could happen, for instance, when a sufficiently large underestimate of government
spending is fed into a model with too high fiscal multipliers.
There is real need for tests designed to deal effectively with this analytical
situation. What errors are actually being made in the exogenous forecasts? What
precisely can be established about the role and effects of such errors in forecasting
with an econometric model of a given structure? A detailed investigation of this
subject for each of the major models could contribute much to our knowledge of
the models and forecasting processes involved and perhaps even to their im-
provement.
AGGREGATEECONOMIC FORECASTS AND BENCHMARK PREDICTIONS
Comparisons with Naive and Autoregressive Extrapolations
Forecastingaccuracy is a relative concept. There is no absolute standard by which
to judge the quality of economic forecasts. In any event, however, economic
forecasts should not be inferior to mechanical extrapolations in serving the pur-
poses of their users. In practice, this should mean that forecasters try to utilize
efficiently the predictive power of the past values of the series they predict.
It also means that economists qua forecasters must suffer their predictions to
undergo the tests of "naive," and even of not so naive, extrapolative models.
However, not all interpretations of such tests are fair and acceptable.
Haitovsky and Treyz [9] report on systematic comparisons of Wharton and
OBE forecasts with predictions from three extrapolative models: Ni, which
projects forward the last known (base-period) level of the given variable; N2,
which projects the last known change; and N3, which projects the average relation
59of the present level to the past levels of the series by means of fourth-order auto-
regressive equations estimated with quarterly data for the sample period of the
model (Wharton: 1948-64; OBE: 1953_II_1967).b0 Table 1-3 illustrates the results
for the ex ante (OR) forecasts of GNP.
TABLE 1-3
Wharton and OBE Model Lx Ante Forecasts of GNP over Spans of from




Mean Absolute Errors (MAE)
1966 111—1969 III 1967 11—1969 III
Wharton OBE
Forecast Model (XA)'N2 b N3° Model (XA)N2 b N3°
(quarters) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
One 3.75 3.57 5.32 2.12 3.17 2.38
Two 7.82 7.51 11.56 7.82 7.34 3.83
Three 10.37 12.62 17.80 12.73 12.92 4.48
Four 12.62 17.72 25.54 19.48 15.88 4.92
Next year 6.58 10.81 14.23 11.47 9.34 3.53
U MAEof ex ante forecasts with original adjustments.
bExtrapolationsof the last-known change, according to the form A,+1 =A,+
Ais an actual value and u is a random error assumed to be zero.
Fourth-order autoregressive extrapolation:=ao +aiAs + aaA,_i + aaA,_2 +
a,A,-3 + u.+1, based on the assumption that u 0.
The table lists the mean absolute errors for the forecasts and the corresponding
statistics for the best and second-best of the three N models. These turn out to be
N2 and N3, but with different ranks for the two sets of comparisons which involve
different sample and forecast periods (cf. columns 2—3 and 5—6). The Wharton
forecasts have on the average smaller errors than the extrapolative benchmark
models, except for the two shortest spans, where N2 is somewhat more accurate.
The OBE forecasts are less accurate than N3 except for the one-quarter span, and
less accurate than N2 in a few instances.
According to corresponding measures for other variables, the errors of N3 are
on the average smaller than those of N2 for consumption (C), but larger than N2
in government expenditures. Ni works best for gross private domestic investment
(GPDI), but elsewhere tends to be the least accurate of the three benchmark
models. The econometric forecasts are for the largest part more accurate than the
extrapolative predictions, but N3 has smaller average errors for most spans than
Wharton for real CMI' and than OBE for C and GFDI.
Table 1-4 presents a more extensive array of summary statistics of error for
still other types of extrapolations and some selected business forecasts. It includes,
in addition to the naive models Ni and N2, projections of the average value of
past changes in the given series as available to the forecaster from the historical
10SeeTable 1-3, footnotes b and c. An attempt was made in these tests to allow for the effects
of data revisions. The ex ante forecasts are based on lagged values representing preliminary
data. In [5], the values of revised actual changes are added to these preliminary figures on level
to form the series of realization, A.. This procedure has two drawbacks: First, certain incon-
sistencies can arise within the set of the actual values thus computed; e.g., as pointed out by
George Green, ratios of the estimates for GNP and the price deflator would deviate from.the
estimates for real GNP. Second, the implicit assumption behind these calculations is that data
revisions affect the levels rather than the changes in the series, but, as shown in [3, Chap. VII,
the revisions of the quarterly estimates of GNP and its components do affect the major pat-
terns of change as well as the levels. However, it is far from obvious how data revisions should
be handled in the context of forecast evaluation; other approaches to the problem present
different difficulties.
60TABLE 1-4
Summary Measures of Error for Extrapolations of Naive and Autoregressive






Naiveand Autoregressive Extrapolations Selected Forecasts
Ni N2 N2* b N3
C SetB Set F Set G
Error' (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Gross National Product (billions of dollars)
ME —19.9 —8.8 —1.9 —6.4 —2.8 —4.8 1.8
SD 15.2 18.1 15.9 14.7 10.8 7.8 8.1
MAE 22.7 16.0 11.6 13.7 9.7 8.1 6.9
RMSE 24.6 19.3 15.3 15.4 11.2 9.1 8.3
Industrial Production (1947-49 =100)
ME —4.2 0.7 1.1 —4.5 n.a. 0.8 2.5
SD 10.2 12.3 10.3 8.9 n.a. 4.8 4.4
MAE 9.2 10.5 7.2 7.5 n.a. 3.9 4.2
RMSE 10.6 11.8 9.9 9.6 n.a. 4.9 5.0
Personal Consumption Expenditures (billions of dollars)
ME —12.9 —3.8 —2.9 —1.4 —1.3 —3.0 n.a.
SD 4.9 8.3 5.0 6.1 5.6 4.8 n.a.
MAE 12.9 7.5 4.7 4.9 4.6 4.8 n.a.
RMSE 13.7 8.8 5.6 5.9 5.7 5.7 n.a.
Gross Private Domestic Investment (billions of dollars)
ME —2.9 —5.4 0.1 —3.9 —2.7 —1.3 n.a.
SD 8.7 15.3 9.2 7.9 6.9 4.4 n.a.
MAE 7.1 11.0 6.4 7.4 6.3 3.9 n.a.
RMSE 9.2 16.2 9.2 8.8 7.4 4.6 n.a.
n.a. =notavailable.
'ME =meanerror; SD =standarddeviation or errors; MAEmean absolute error;
RMSE =rootmean square error. — —
b Theassumption of N2* is that A.+1 =A1+ iXA + Ug+i, where is the average value of
past changes in A, computed from some starting date (here 1947) up to and including the
most recent value known at the time of the forecast. Again, in the prediction U,÷i =0.
CBasedon regressions ofon A._1, where the A's denote the actual values of the given
variable; i1, 2,..., 5 forGNP and industrial production; i =1,2 for consumption; and
=1for GPDI. See text for more detail.
record (N2*; see Table 1-4, footnote b). The autoregressive predictions (N3) are
based on quarterly series in a moving sample period, that is, on equations that
are re-estimated so as to add information from the recent data points that could
have been used in the corresponding annual forecast.1'
The simple trend projections (N2*) produce smaller mean absolute errors than
any of the other N models for each of the four variables covered, but in terms of
the root mean square errors the autoregressive models (N3) are more accurate
than N2* for industrial production and gross private domestic investment (col-
umns 3 and 4). Except for consumption, N3 shows more indication of bias (larger
Extrapolatedvalues are substituted for the as yet unknown actual values in the autore-
gression designed to predict more than one quarter ahead. For example,)! a third-order form
is prediction for two quarters ahead would be:=a+ ++
where=a++ + (this assumes that
A is the theactual
values A,_,, in which more of the former and fewer of the latter terms are being used as the pre-
dictive span is increased. To derive annual benchmark predictions, the coefficients a, b1, b2,.
are typically re-estimated each year in the first step of the process, relating to the fourth quarter
of the base year, and are retained in the following four steps which refer, respectively, to each
of the successive quarters of the target year. The scheme implies an increase in the variance
of the residual errors Us+4 as the span i is lengthened [19, p. 102).
61absolute values of ME) but less of inefficiency (smaller SD) in comparison with
N2*. Ni and N2 yield for the most part considerably larger errors than either N2*
or N3 (note, however, the relatively good showing of Ni for GPDI).
The three sets of authentic ex ante forecasts labeled B, F, and G come from the
collection examined in my 1967 study [19] and represent well-known financial
and publishing sources. These forecasts have on the average smaller errors than
any of the included N models, except for consumption, where they are about as
accurate as N2* and N3.
It might seem that the comparisons with extrapolations are more favorable to
these business forecasts than to the econometric model forecasts, but the differ-
ences between the measures in Tables 1-3 and 1-4 are such as to preclude any reli-
able conclusions on the matter. The autoregressive models (N3) are not computed
alike in the two sets of comparisons. Also, and this is probably more important,
the forecasting periods differ in ways that are apt to affect the results.
The tabulation below of summary statistics of errors in annual GNP forecasts
illustrates how sensitive the measures of relative accuracy of forecasts and extrap-
olations of various types can be with regard to differences in the periods (Mp is
in billions of dollars):
SetB SetF SeIC
1953-631964-69 1953-631964-69 1953-631964-69
10.7 15.2 8.8 14.3 7.9 17.0
Mp/MN1 0.435 0.276 0.359 0.258 0.322 0.306
MAD/MN2 0.553 1.024 0.457 0.959 0.410 1.140
Mp/MN2* 0.699 0.421 0.578 0.394 0.518 0.467
The years 1953-63 witnessed three business recessions; in the years 1964-69 the
growth in GNP was relatively steady and uninterrupted by any major declines.
The errors of the forecasts, not surprisingly, tend to be considerably larger
in the latter than in the former period, reflecting the strong upward trend in the
GNP series; this is clearly exemplified by the root mean square errors (Mp) of the
three sets of business forecasts.'2 But such an increase in absolute errors need not
denote a worsening of the forecasts. In terms of the ratios ofto the corre-
sponding measures for the naive model Ni, the performance of the forecasters
improved (the Mp/MN1 figures are smaller for 1964-69 than for 1953-63). Sim-
ilarly, the root mean standard error (RMSE) ratios declined when the N2* model
was used as a yardstick. Thus it can be said that the GNP forecast errors increased
on the average less between the two periods than did the mean annual change in
GNP measured either individually in the years covered or cumulatively over the
postwar years.13
12Beingbased on small numbers of observations, the root mean square error statistics




whereE1P1 —A1,= and the denote summations over t= 1,..., n.The
former, unadjusted estimates are listed asin the preceding tabulation; the latter ones, with
an adjustment for sample size, are used in the RMSElinesin Table 1-4.
12Therelative deterioration of the benchmark extrapolations N2*, which is indicated by
these results, suggests that it might be better to use a moving period for the computation of
the average historical change rather than a period with a fixed origin in the increasingly remote
past. To quote Samuelson [17], "just as there is a time for remembering, there is a time for
forgetting." Of course, the N2* model represents an extremely simple type of trend extrapola-
tion. There are various ways by which the recent past can be emphasized and the distant past
de-emphasized in extrapolative models. (In one of the most popular formulas, prediction is
by means of a linear adaptation model with coefficients declining exponentially in the direction
of the past.) For series that show fairly steady rates of growth much of the time, it may also
be better to use relative rather than absolute changes as the basis for trend projections.
62On the other hand, comparisons of the same forecasts with simple extrapola-
tions of last-known changes (Mp/MN2) clearly show the more recent judgmental
predictions in much worse light than the earlier ones. (It will be recalled that such
naive projections also proved relatively strong when confronted with the econo-
metric forecasts in Table 1-3.) In times of sustained growth, the N2 extrapolations
are at their best (the model performs much worse, of course, in times of weaker
trends and stronger cyclical movements, as during the post-Korean decade).
FactorsInfluencing the Relative Accuracy of Forecasts and Extrapolations
Manyimportant economic aggregates, particularly such nominal quantities as
GNP, consumption expenditures, and the price level, contain strong trend and
autoregressive elements which should be exploited in the forecasts. However, fore-
casters must also predict the course of important variables that are much more vol-
atile and sensitive to business fluctuations, e.g., the unemployment rate, inventory
investment, and interest rates, which may often be strongly influenced by regres-
sive rather than extrapolative expectations. Furthermore, forecasters' services
appear to be particularly sought after—and tested—in the neighborhood of actual
and suspected turning points in business and financial activity. Simple naive
models either do not predict any turns at all or merely reproduce the actual turns
with lags. Higher-order autoregressive models can, in principle, produce forecasts
of turning points, but there is some evidence that they are poor predictors of the
timing of such events [19, Chap. 6]. Actual changes often show much higher cor-
relations with the changes predicted by forecasters than with the changes pro-
duced by autoregressive extrapolations; e.g., for GNP, 1953-63, the r2coefficient
measuring the predictive efficiency of set F in this sense is .814,andr2forset C is
.778, whereas, for the best of the autoregressive models examined, r2.179(see
[14, Table 1-5 and text]). To be sure, extrapolative models better than N3 can
frequently be constructed, although this is likely to require considerably more
information and computational processing. However, such improvements are
much more likely to take the form of reduced systematic errors than of reduced
predictive inefficiency of the extrapolations.14
If forecasts are apt to prove better at turning points that did actually occur,
they are also apt to prove worse than extrapolations at times when turning points
were expected, but failed to materialize. The two types of directional error may
have different costs or consequences, and, if so, should be given correspondingly
different weights. With equal weights, at least, the evidence is predominantly
favorable to the forecasts. Because false warnings are much less numerous than
missed turns, directional errors in general are considerably more frequent in
extrapolations than in forecasts [19, pp. 114-20].
Average errors of judgmental business forecasts often increase more rapidly
with lengthening span than do the average errors of trend projections N2* and
autoregressive predictions N3. For example, the ratio Mp/MN2* is .67 for six-
month and .82 for twelve-month predictions of industrial output, according to
measures for mean forecasts of a large group of business economists, 1947-63.
Apparently, many forecasters fail to use effectively the past record of their series
in predicting developments beyond the two or three quarters ahead.
There are also some contrary considerations, however, which apply to fore-
casts based on more sophisticated models. Some economic relationships involve
long distributed lags, and these may be more helpful in forecasting over intermedi-
For a discussion of sophisticated techniques recently developed for optimal characteriza-
tion of discrete linear processes, see [1].Somesupport for the statement in the text is found
lii the preliminary results obtained by Mervin Daub in "An Appraisal of Canadian Short-Term
Aggregate Economic Forecasts," a proposed dissertation draft, Graduate School of Business,
University of Chicago (1970). This work, among others, applies the Box-Jenkins techniques
in comparisons with Canadian GNP forecasts. Further study of the relative performance of
these models, with applications to U.S. forecasts, is planned.
63ate time spans than extrapolations based on trend projections or autoregressions.
The lagged values of the dependent variables in an autoregressive equation may
serve as strong proxies for the true "causal" variables of a structural model, which
have similar timing. But if the autoregressive model contains only a few terms for
the shortest lags and the structural model also contains longer lags in exogenous
and other endogenous variables, the two matrices of the respective "explanatory"
variables will be less well correlated. The longer lags of the structural model may
contribute mainly to the accuracy of the longer forecasts and, if so, especially
for these forecasts, the autoregressive scheme should be less useful. Accordingly,
in a recent debate on ways and results of testing the predictive performance of
econometric models vs. autoregressive extrapolations, several model builders and
critics have argued that such tests are more powerful when ipplied to multiperiod
forecasts with longer spans than when applied to short single-period forecasts
only.15 Furthermore, the expectation was expressed that the comparisons involv-
ing longer predictions would prove to be substantially more favorable to the
econometric models.
Comparisons of the type presented in Table 1-3 provide tests of the validity
of this contention. Their evidence, however, is mixed. Ratios of the correspond-
ing mean absolute errors of ex ante forecasts and autoregressive extrapolations
decline as the length of the span increases for the Wharton predictions of several
variables (GNP, GPDI, and the exogenous forecasts of government spending).
For some other variables and, particularly, for the OBE predictions, the ratios
behave irregularly or even increase with the length of the span.16
QUARTERLYSURVEYS OF MULTIPERIOD FORECASTS BY DIFFERENT METHODS
General Characteristics and Results of the ASA.NBER Surveys
Beginningin the last quarter of 1968,theAmerican Statistical Association has
conducted quarterly surveys of forecasts by those members of its Business and
Economics Statistics Section who are professionally engaged in a continuing
analysis of the business outlook. The National Bureau cooperated with the ASA
in designing the questionnaire for the surveys and it regularly processes and
evaluates the results.17
The surveys cover total GNP and some of its more sensitive or autonomous
expenditure components, and, also, industrial production, unemployment, cor-
porate profits, housing starts, and the implicit price deflator. Forecasts for the
current and the following three quarters are produced on each occasion, but at
mid-year and year-end predictive spans of five and six quarters are used. In-
formation is also collected on the composition of the sample, the methods and
assumptions of the forecasters, and the probabilities they attach to different
expected outcomes of anticipated changes in GNP and the price level.
Over fifty forecasters took part in each of the recent ASA-NBER surveys. They
represent a broadly based and diversified group, in terms of their primary affilia-
tion and location. The rates of turnover and attrition were initially rather high,
but they quickly declined, and most of the present members have excellent or good
records of participation in the past surveys. The group averages presumably reflect
See the comments on Cooper [4) by Goldfeld, McCarthy, and the OBE Econometric Branch
staff [9a]. Also see [101.
results can be linked to differences between the two sets of econometric forecasts—
the OBE predictions of endogenous variables appear relatively more successful for the short
spans, the Wharton predictions for the longer spans; and to differences between the two
applications of the N3 model—the errors of the latter are on the whole smaller in the set com-
pared with the OBE forecasts than in the set compared with the Wharton forecasts. This last
finding is presumably due mainly to the fact that the Wharton sample period (1948-64) differs
much more than the OBE sample period (1953-67) from the forecast periods of 1966 (1967)-69.
17CharlotteBoschan and I share the responsibility for this analysis. For a description of the
new survey and an assessment of some early results, see [21][221;also, see the press releases
in successive issues of the American Statistician from April 1969 on.
64well the trends in what is sometimes called the "standard forecast," but the in-
dividual forecasts and their distributions deserve no less attention. For example,
changes in the dispersion of member forecasts around the group averages may
have interesting implications as indications of the varying degree of uncertainty
and consensus among the forecasters.
Table 1-5 presents the means and standard deviations of errors for all fore-
casts of three selected variables from the first seven ASA-NBER surveys. When
read line by line across the table, the figures show the accuracy of predictions
made at a given date for successively more distant target periods. There is the
usual tendency for the average errors and the dispersion of errors to increase
with the span of forecast, but it is easy to find exceptions to this rule in the
average errors relating to particular surveys. It appears that these cases reflect
mainly the forecasters' failure to anticipate major deviations from recent trends
such as the slowdown in 1969111-19701: note, e.g., the results for the May 1969
survey in line 3.
When read column by column, the table tells us how the averages and disper-
sion of errors of forecasts for a given variable change as the target period draws
nearer in each successive survey. Here, too, the predictive span varies, but the
analytical situation differs from that involved in the line-by-line comparisons.
There the total fund of information available to any forecaster can be taken to
be fixed as of the date at which the survey questionnaire was filled out, for all
spans. Here new information becomes available to the forecaster between the
surveys, including, importantly, any lessons from the errors of the preceding
forecast. This information appears to yield considerable advantages. Thus, read-
ing down any of the columns 2-7 in Table 1-5, one finds a systematic improvement
in the forecasts for any of the variables covered, that is, progressively smaller
average errors (taken without regard to sign) and smaller standard deviations
of errors. These gains in accuracy are on the whole more pronounced and regular
than the intrasurvey gains from reductions in the time span of the forecast
(which can be observed by reading the entries in each line from right to left).
A systematic learning process is strongly indicated by the results for GNP.
As long as underestimates (indicated by the negative signs in Table 1-5) pre-
vailed, each survey improved upon the previous one by revising the forecasts
upward: this applies to the predictions of December 1968 and February, May,
and August 1969. The December 1969 forecasts were also higher than the cor-
responding averages from the August 1969 survey, but this time the upward
adjustment proved counterproductive: The forecasters overshot the actual values
by failing to recognize adequately the deceleration of GNP. In the next two sur-
veys, however, this error was largely corrected. Apparently noting the emergence
of overestimates in the period, the forecasters revised their predictions downward
in these surveys, thereby tending to reduce the errors. These results are suggestive
of elements of partially successful adaptive forecasting.
Finally, moving along any of the diagonals in Table 1-5 allows us to compare
the errors in successive forecasts for approximately the same span. For GNP and
some other variables such as the price deflator, this exercise shows that the predic-
tions from the three earliest surveys have been substantially less accurate than
the more recent ones. However, the arrays of the error measures for some volatile
series, such as the changes in inventories and the unemployment rate, show much
less evidence of this and the other regularities here discussed.
TheMethods Reported and the Accuracy of Forecasts
Ineach survey, the participants are asked to rank the methods identified in
Table 1-6 according to their relative importance in the forecaster's own work.
In December 1968, over 80 per cent report\ed using an informal GNP model, and














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0addition, about one-fifth of the survey members had their own econometric
models, and more than half made use of models designed by others. These propor-
tions, which disregard the ranks assigned to these methods or procedures, are
also roughly indicative of the corresponding distributions in the later surveys.
What is here labeled an informal GNF model embraces, one suspects, a variety of
procedures whereby the forecasters predict the major expenditure components of
GNP, add these figures to obtain an over-all forecast, finally check and, if needed,
repeatedly adjust the results for plausibility and consistency. It is an eclectic,
"intuitive," or "opportunistic" approach,18 in which judgment typically plays a
large role, although various models of macroeconomic relationships are probably
often employed, at least implicitly. From about half to two-thirds of the partici-
pants in each survey ranked this approach as first. On the average, approximately
13 per cent of the forecasters ranked the leading indicators as first; 8 per cent,
outside models; and 6 per cent, own econometric models.
Considerable effort has been made to establish whether the different methods
or groupings of methods were associated with significantly different degrees of
forecasting accuracy. This analysis relied mainly on regressions of forecast errors
on dummy variables representing the different methods, with separate estimates
being made for each survey and target quarter (predictive span). Table 1-6 presents
a sample of results for two of the surveys, using forecasts of GNP. In each of
these regression equations, the individual forecast errors serve as the dependent
variable and the forecasters are classified by the first-ranked methods. The con-
stant terms a (column 1) are estimates of the expected values of the errors for
those forecasters who ranked the informal GNP model first, always the largest
group.'° Thecoefficients of the dummy variables are estimates of the differences
between these average errors and those of the groups who ranked the other (ith)
method first. The t statistics (ratios of thecoefficients to their respective stand-
ard errors) indicate the statistical significance of these differences.
As illustrated in Table 1-6, relatively few of thecoefficients appear to be
significant (less than one in four at the 10 per cent level, one in six at the 5 per cent
level, according to a count that includes also the other surveys not included in the
table). Over 60 per cent of all significant coefficients are concentrated in the very
thinly populated groups: anticipations surveys, other methods, and methods not
elsewhere classified (columns 5-7). These are mostly negative, often large, devia-
tions, which suggests that the forecasters in these groups had a relatively poor
record because of large underestimation errors.
According to these results, no systematic differences appear between the ac-
curacy of the forecasters who used principally the informal GNP model, those
who favored the econometric models, and those who favored the leading indicators
approach. Tests designed to include the evidence of all ranks (rather than only
the first ranks) lead to the same general conclusion. To be sure, the number of
different rankings is so large that the dummy-variables approach is not applicable
to all the combinations that can be distinguished, given the size of the available
samples. But it was possible to try out a few alternatives based on simplified
classification schemes, and these revealed no significant differences between the
three principal methods (informal GNP model; econometric models, own and
outside; and leading indicators combined with anticipations surveys) as far as
the accuracy of forecasting GNP is concerned.
Should we then read these results as saying that it does not matter, at least for
the accuracy of the GNP forecasts, which methods are being used and how they
Thesedescriptive terms have been used by some practitioners or sympathetic observers of
this type of forecasting. See [2,pp.137-59][11, pp.389ff.].
19Aselsewhere, the errors are computed by subtracting the actual from the predicted values.
Hence, the negative signs of the coefficients indicate average underestimates; positive signs,
average overestimates. The constant terms often fairly well resemble the corresponding over-all
mean errors, and they are generally highly signfficant, as would be expected.
67TABLE 1-6
Forecasting Accuracy andForecastingMethod, Evidence from ASA-NBER
Business Outlook Surveys, Regressions with Dummy Variables, 1968-70
Estimated Coefficients of the Regression Equation:4 E= a+ D4
Econo- Ecorto-
Informal metric metric LeadingAnticipa-
GNP Model—Model— Indica- tions Other
Model Own Outside tors SurveysMethods N.E.C.
Forecast a bj 132 b0
Quarterb (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
December 1968 Survey





































































a Eis the individual forecast error (predicted minus actual value) for the given survey and
target quarter. The dummy variablesassume the value 1 for the method i, zero otherwise.
The methods for i =1,..., 6are identified below in the headings for columns 2-7 (e.g., econo-
metric models, own and outside, have indexes 1 and 2, respectively, etc.). N.E.C. =notelsewhere
classified. The method labeled "informal GNP model" is represented by the constant (column 1).
The classification is by first ranks only. The figures in parentheses show the t ratios for the
corresponding coefficients in the line above (the signs of these ratios, which are the same as
those of the coefficients, are omitted).
Span of forecast, in quarters, is indicated in parentheses.
coefficient significant at the 10 per cent level.
dcoefficient significant at the 5percent level.
are combined? It is possible that this is so, but quite unlikely, if the statement
were to apply strictly to all kinds of well-defined methods. The survey question-
naire refers to general approaches used in macroeconomic forecasting rather than
to any specific models and procedures. It may be that such methodological dis-
tinctions among practicing economic forecasters are seldom sufficiently large and
systematic to produce clear-cut differences in the observed accuracy of aggregative
forecasts. In other words, it is possible that the findings illustrated in Table 1-6
reflect mainly the vagueness of the methodological classification used. If sharper
distinctions were available, stronger elements of relationship between forecasting
accuracy and forecasting method might be found. However, the very fact that no
single method commands the general adherence of regular economic forecasters
indicates that none was expected to be consistently more accurate than others.
CONCLUSION
Inan era of rapid growth of national economic statistics, econometrics, and com-
puter technology, complex models of the economy can be built and used in fore-
casting, and they are. Yet, in practice, economic forecasting is still very much the
68domain of individual accomplishment, of experience and judicious application of
past and current data in drawing probabilistic inferences about the future. At
least for two of the more important U.S. macroeconometric models, the major
importance of the interaction between the model and its builders and operators is
clearly demonstrated by the advantages of the ex ante forecasts over the ex post
ones. Business economists' forecasts, which are not based on formal, explicit
models but rely largely on general economic theory and judgment in interpreting
the data, often include predictions that are about as accurate as the over-all fore-
casts made with econometric models. Mechanistic predictions, whether based on
extrapolative benchmark models or on econometric models applied cx post with-
out arty adjustments (but with the advantage of correct exogenous inputs!) have
on the whole been less accurate. (However, in particular periods even some naive
models may often "outguess" all kinds of bona fide forecasts, as did the same-
change extrapolations—N2—during the long expansion of the 1960's.)
No single, well-defined, and reproducible model commands the loyalty of any
large group of economic forecasters in business, government, and academic insti-
tutions. The main reason for this is probably that none has been proved to be
consistently superior. Forecasters are properly interested first of all in better fore-
casting, and any approach that held out a good promise to result in more accurate
predictions would fairly promptly attract many followers, regardless of its other
characteristics.
This, of course, is not to deny that forecasters, like economists in general, do
have their theoretical and ideological preferences; for example, some are "mone-
tarists" and pay great attention to changes in money supply, others of Keynesian
persuasion place more emphasis on fiscal variables. Accordingly, a broad distinc-
tion can be made between such groups of forecasters, and comparisons between
the results of their respective approaches should be instructive, especially where
"families" of explicit models can be studied on both sides of the issue.2°
No scientific progress can be accomplished by economists qua forecasters, as a
group, without systematic testing of the different verifiable and replicable fore-
casting methods. Hence a major question for future research is how to forecast
best (given a number of well-defined procedures or "models"); the question of
who forecasts best (given predictions from various sources based on undefined
combinations of various approaches) is per se of much less interest. This implies
the need to study the performance of diverse, specific models. The main practical
difficulty here is that the available samples of observations are small, the series
of interesting ex ante forecasts being as a rule quite short. This can be fully cor-
rected only by the progression of time in which more data accumulate, but mean-
while partial gains might be made by intensive studies of materials from new
and underexplored sources and of various simulations and ex post predictions.
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